

ARETHUSA MONOGRAPHS X

IBN AT-TAYYIB

**PROCLUS' COMMENTARY
ON THE PYTHAGOREAN GOLDEN VERSES**

Arabic Text and Translation

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**Gift of
L.G.
Westerink
Collection
(donated by
John M.
Duffy)**



B11495

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The author of this monograph, Neil Linley (born April 8, 1946), received his B.A. degree in Classics from Selwyn College, Cambridge, England (1967), and his M.A. also from the University of Cambridge (1972). He spent four and a half years, from 1970 to 1974, in the Near East, first in Libya, then in Saudi Arabia, teaching English to Arabic speaking students. From 1974 to 1978 he was a graduate student in the Department of Classics in the State University of New York at Buffalo. In the following years most of his time was devoted to his thesis project, the edition and translation of the Arabic text published in the present monograph. He died on June 23, 1982, only a few weeks before his planned thesis defense. The degree of Doctor of Philosophy was awarded posthumously by the State University of New York at Buffalo.

If Dr. Linley had lived to prepare this monograph for publication, he would have added at least the elements of a commentary, containing in particular the principal references to parallel passages in Greek texts. Under the circumstances, however, it was decided not to interfere with the work, apart from minor editorial adjustments, so that it should remain entirely Dr. Linley's contribution — and a very worthwhile one — to classical and Arabic scholarship. The Arabic text is a facsimile of Dr. Linley's handwritten copy.

Because the Department of Classics had no one competent to deal with a work in Arabic, Professor George F. Hourani, of the Department of Philosophy, very kindly undertook the task of thesis supervisor. The Department of Classics wants to express its gratitude to him and to the outside reader, Professor Franz Rosenthal (Yale), for their encouraging interest in the project and for many helpful suggestions; and to Dr. Gabriel Lahood, who besides eliminating some grammatical and orthographical anomalies, did a final collation of the Arabic text with the photocopies of the manuscript.

L. G. Westerink
Editor, Arethusa Monographs

INTRODUCTION

1. *Manuscript*

The present edition is based upon the text preserved in MS 888 in the Arabic collection of the Escorial Library in Madrid. The title-page of the manuscript reads: *kitāb an-nukat waṭ-ṭimār at-ṭibbīya wal-falsafīya*: "Book of Medical and Philosophical Gists and Fruits."

As for a date for the manuscript, F. Rosenthal¹ has noted two dated owner's marks on the title-page (the earliest 722/1322).

The manuscript consists of fourteen sections, of which the present text, the eighth section, occupies folios 91a to 114a. An incomplete list of the contents of the manuscript may be found in Brockelmann.²

One section only of the manuscript has been edited to date; the final section, dealing with the *Tabula Cebetis*, is treated by Rosenthal.³

The manuscript is clearly and carefully written, in a *naskhī* hand. Words omitted from the body of the text are inserted, vertically or horizontally, in the margin, and an omission-sign ـ inserted in the text, at the point at which the omission occurs.

As was the custom, the diacritics used in Arabic to distinguish between the phonetic values of consonants having the same basic written form (for example ج j, ح ḥ, خ kh) are frequently omitted, nor is altogether consistent use made of the sign of 'ihmāl, which indicates that diacritics are absent; this sign, a small subscript ḥā' (for use with jīm, ḥā', and khā') or 'ayn (to distinguish between 'ayn and ghayn) is occasionally used by the scribe when in fact a diacritic should have been present (or must be read as present).

A further feature of the manuscript is the tendency of *hamza* to disappear, and this happens, generally speaking, in one of two ways; when

¹ "The Symbolism of the Tabula Cebetis," in *Recherches d'Islamologie*, Bibliothèque Philosophique de Louvain 26 (Louvain, 1978), pp. 274-83.

² *Geschichte der arabischen Literatur*, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1943-1949) I 635, and *Supplementbände* (Leiden, 1937-1942) I 884.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 277-83.

the *hamza* is in final position, in which it lacks a bearer, it disappears entirely. For example:

سوء	becomes	سو	(58.2)
بشيء	becomes	شئ	passim
للغرباء	becomes	للغربا	(4.7)
الآباء	becomes	الابا	(10.7)

Otherwise, in the case of medial *hamza*, some alteration takes place; the original bearer of *hamza* usually recovers its vocalic or consonantal value (so that **أ** becomes **ا**, **ؤ** becomes **و** — for example, رؤساء becomes رؤسا, at 52.4 — and **ي** becomes consonantal **ي**). In cases where medial *hamza* could correctly be written without a bearer, the position disappears, as for example شياء becomes شيا (4.3), يرياء becomes يريا (56.5) and الرديئة becomes الرديه (54.8).

The scribe tends to be uncomfortable with Greek names, other than the best-known (فلاطون is standard for 'Plato,' سقراط occurs once, in the standard form, for 'Socrates'): examples are تاليس, completely unpointed, occurring once (2.8) for Θαλής, and 'Empedocles' is rendered امبادمليس, that is 'Mbādmls, the second 'm' being evidently a mechanical error for q, or امبادفلس, i.e., 'Mbādqls. 'Athens' is rendered, without pointing, اتيه (most likely to be read 'Athīniyah').

In the section devoted to numerology (76.9-80.9) 'Zeus' is rendered زائوش (78.5); it may be better to read this as زائوش (Zāwš), as this was a common Arabic rendering of the name.⁵ 'Athene' becomes اتينا ('Aθīnā), demonstrating an exact correspondence (*ibid.*); in the same sentence, the deity symbolized by the number seven is named as تكون ,

⁴ Cf. *Galenī Compendium Timaei Platonis*, edd. P. Kraus, R. Walzer (London, 1951), (Plato Arabus, I), text p. ٢٠.

⁵ P. Kunitzsch, "Zeus in Bagdad. Zu einem Gedicht von Abū Nuwās," in Diem and Wild (edd.), *Studien aus Arabistik und Semitistik* (Wiesbaden, 1980), pp. 99-113.

which may well have been, as Dr Rosenthal suggested to me, بلون , or perhaps ابلون , that is 'Απόλλων, a perfectly acceptable rendering.

The allocation of the number three to Athene is puzzling, as Athene was normally associated with seven: because she was ἀμήτωρ and παρθένος, seven was the one number out of the decad which best suited her,⁶ on the ground that of the numbers from one to ten, no two numbers can be combined by multiplication to generate seven, nor can seven combine by multiplication to produce any number that has the value ten or less. Hence, although in Iamblichus, at any rate, Apollo is nowhere found as an epithet of seven,⁷ he is not ruled out as the name behind تكون , as the allocation of three to Athene is also unattested by Iamblichus.

Another imported word of great interest occurs in three forms in the text (two are apparently derived from an original importation *kumr*). At 20.3 the كرىون are said to be the servants or ministers of the demons. At 94.7 the same word is used adjectivally to describe a nature that is present within us, equated by the author with the Pythagorean θεῖον γένος (verse 63), and identified with the intellect. This word does not appear in the standard lexicons. Dr Rosenthal has kindly pointed out to me that the plural form found at 20.3 may go back to كمرى "a pagan priest," derived from Aramaic *kumrā*,⁸ and which appears in Christian Arabic. The adjectival form occurring at 94.7 may have been generated by the present author.

2. The Author

Brockelmann (GAL I² 635) provides the following identification:

Abu 'l-Farağ 'Abdallāh b. at-Ṭayyib al-'Irāqī was Secretary to Catholicos Elias I, physician and teacher at the 'Aḍud Hospital in Baghdad; he died 435/1043.

In *Suppl.* I 884 he is named identically, except that *al-Ġāthālīq* is added to the name.

⁶ [Iamblichus] *Theologoumena Arithmeticae*, 54.11 de Falco.

⁷ *Op. cit.* Index (Epitheta Numerorum), pp. 89, 90.

⁸ Hollady's *Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament* (Leiden, 1973), gives "pl. כַּמְרִים : priest (of pagan gods)."

Graf⁹ furnishes a full account of ibn at-Ṭayyib's life, literary output and teaching activity. The following account is given of his life:

Abu 'l-Faraġ 'Abdallāh ibn at-Ṭayyib al 'Irāqī, philosopher, physician, monk and priest in one person, worked and wrote during the first half of the eleventh century. The following dates in his life are confirmed:

'Abdallāh ibn at-Ṭayyib studied medicine and was already practising it in 1015/16 (406 H.) at the hospital named after its founder, 'Aḍud ad-Daula. He was Patriarchal Secretary under Catholicos Yūḥannā ibn Nāzūk (1012-1022), was held in the highest esteem by the new ruler of Baghdad and of all Iraq, Ġalāl ad-Daula, and chaired the electoral council that elected Elias (I) to the position of Catholicos (1028-1049). As the latter's secretary, in 1028, he prepared the ecclesiastical approval for the account of Elias of Nisibis on his "seven sessions." Ibn at-Ṭayyib died at the end of October 1043 and was buried in the church at Dartā.

3. *The Pythagorean Χρυσᾶ ἔπη in the Arabic Tradition*

The Pythagorean poem known as the Χρυσᾶ ἔπη reached the Arabs in the form of a literal translation. Professor M. Ullmann, in an unpublished work (Diss. Munich 1959), collates a number of Arabic versions of the text. These versions may be regarded as copies of a single authoritative translation with some variants of a minor nature.

One Arabic version has been translated¹⁰ into German, and thence into English.¹¹ On the whole, the standard of translation is quite high,

⁹ *Geschichte der Christlichen Arabischen Litteratur*, II (Vatican, 1947), pp. 160ff.

¹⁰ By F. Rosenthal, in *Das Fortleben der Antike im Islam* (Artemis: Zürich, 1965), pp. 165-68.

¹¹ In *The Classical Heritage in Islam* (a translation by E. and J. Marmorstein of Rosenthal's *Fortleben*), (Berkeley, 1975), pp. 118-120.

although at times the result is flat and obscure: τοὺς τε καταχθονίους . . . δαίμονας (verse 3), for example, comes out as *عَمَّارُ الْأَرْضِ*, that is "inhabitants of the earth," and occasionally a gloss is resorted to.

Mullach¹² reports that the *interpretes arabs* presents the reading ἀθάνατον . . . θεόν in place of the more regular plural, in verse 1. Judging only from the section of the present commentary which deals with the first verse, it is tempting to suppose either that the version of verse 1 having the singular form instead of the plural was in fact used by ibn at-Ṭayyib, or that he himself made the adjustment, possibly on the grounds that Muslim readers would find a single deity far more congenial, at least at the outset of the exposition, than the multiplicity of gods, which does, however, reappear at later stages in the work.

4. *Two Arabic Commentaries on the Χρυσᾶ ἔπη.*

Ibn at-Ṭayyib's commentary on the Χρυσᾶ ἔπη shows not the slightest sign of dependence upon the standard Arabic translation of the poem. Whenever he needs to quote verses, he does so by means of what, in the absence of indications to the contrary, must be taken as his own paraphrase of the Greek original.¹³

This independence becomes the more impressive when one consults another Arabic commentary on the Χρυσᾶ ἔπη, preserved at Princeton (MS Garrett 308, ff. 303b - 308b), dated 677/1278-1279, and attributed in the title to Iamblichus. In this case, the commentary is based upon lemmata which, as quoted in the text, are identical with the standard Arabic version presented by Ullmann, with one significant exception.¹⁴

¹² See below p. viii, n. 18.

¹³ One interesting case, possibly an exception, arises in his treatment of verse 36 καὶ πεφύλαξό γε ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὅποσα φθόνον ἴσχει, where φθόνος "envy" is rendered in the commentary by *جسد*. Unfortunately, it appears that, at some stage, this word came to be read, not as *جسد* "envy" (with 'ihmāl of the ḥā), but as *جسد* "body," since the commentary on this verse (ff. 105a-105b) has more to do with the body than it has with envy.

¹⁴ At this point it may be stated, in answer to a question raised by G. Endress (*Proclus Arabus* [Beirut 1973], p. 27), that the contents of the Escorial and Princeton MSS are certainly not identical; whether they ultimately go back to the same Greek source it has been impossible to determine on the basis of a preliminary examination of the 'Iamblichus' commentary.

5. *Ibn at-Ṭayyib's Commentary, Hierocles and Proclus*

Mention has been made elsewhere in this introduction of the fact that the scribe who copied Ibn at-Ṭayyib's commentary was uneasy when confronted with Greek names. The name of Proclus occurs twice in the commentary, once in the title — tafsīr Brqls "Proclus' commentary" — and again at the very end of the text.

This has raised an extremely interesting question, namely, whether there ever was a commentary on the Χρυσᾷ ἔπη by Proclus, and whether Ibn at-Ṭayyib may have had access to it, where we have not; or whether Ibn at-Ṭayyib's commentary "is a misattribution, due to the misreading of Buruḳlus for the less known Neoplatonist Hierocles (which can be easily explained)."¹⁵

The explanation hinted at by Walzer depends precisely upon the vicissitudes suffered by Greek names at the hands of Arab scribes: in our manuscript, we are presented with the word برقلس = Brqls (i.e., Πρόκλος); if, however, we had been presented with يرقلس, differing from the above by the addition of a single dot, this would equal Yrqls, which is a reasonably adequate rendering of Ἱεροκλῆς. Since Greek names are frequently hard to identify when transplanted into Arabic, the question whether this is a case of misattribution, or misunderstanding of a relatively uncommon name — that of Hierocles — for a commoner one — that of Proclus — becomes the more pressing.

There are, in Arabic sources, references to a commentary by Proclus; an-Nadīm mentions, in his section on Proclus,¹⁶ a commentary on the Χρυσᾷ ἔπη:

كتاب تفسير وصايا فيثاغورس الذهبية خمائة

Noteworthy, however, is the fact (pointed out to me by Professor Westerink) that both commentaries mention the Pythagoreans' use of music, which is not mentioned by Hierocles, although both Iamblichus (V.P. 110) and Porphyry (V.P. 30) refer to it.

The exception to the general fidelity, in the 'Iamblichus' text, to the text furnished by Ullmann, occurs at 307r. 5ff., where the 'lemma' is completely different from the standard form.

¹⁵ R. Walzer, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, I (New Edition, Leiden, 1960), s.v. Buruḳlus.

¹⁶ *Fihrist*, ed. G. Flügel (Leipzig, 1871/2), p. 252; cf. al-Qifī, *Ta'rikh al-Ḥukamā'* 39.10 and Ḥājī Khalīfah, *Kashf az-Zunūn* 2012b.

ورقة ويوجد سرياني علمه لابنته وكان ثابت
نقل منه ثلاثة أوراق ثم توفي ولم يتمه

[Book of] commentary on the Golden Exhortations of Pythagoras, in about 100 folios; there is also a Syriac version; he made it for his daughter. Thābit translated three pages of it, and then died, without having completed it.

As was stated earlier, the question of the relationship between Ibn at-Ṭayyib's commentary and that of Hierocles was originally raised by Walzer. Hierocles' commentary¹⁷ presents the matters raised in the Χρυσᾷ ἔπη in such a way as to make them suitable preparatory material for the student's progression towards the more exacting disciplines of Logic, Physics and Theology:

Ταῦτα δέ (ζωῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κάθαρσις καὶ τελειότης, sc. φιλοσοφία) πέφυκεν ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀλήθεια μάλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι, ἡ μὲν τὴν ἀμετρίαν τῶν παθῶν ἐξορίζει, ἡ δὲ τὸ θεῖον εἶδος τοῖς εὐφυῶς ἔχουσι προσκτωμένη. δεῖ οὖν πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τὴν μέλλουσαν ἡμᾶς καθαρὸς καὶ τελείους ποιεῖν, κανόνας ἔχειν τινὰς ἐν βραχεῖ διωρισμένους, οἷον ἀφορισμούς τινας τεχνικούς, ὅπως ἂν ἐν τάξει καὶ εὐμεθόδως πρὸς τὸ τῆς εὐζωίας τέλος ἀφικώμεθα. τῶν δὲ τοιούτων κανόνων τῶν πρὸς τὴν ὅλην φιλοσοφίαν συντείνοντων τὰ Πυθαγορικά ἔπη τὰ οὕτως ἐπικαλούμενα Χρυσᾷ ἐν πρώτοις ἂν θεήμεν εὐλόγως.

Now, virtue and truth are especially disposed to effectuate these things (the purification and perfection of human life, sc. philosophy). Virtue does this by banishing the excess of the passions, while

¹⁷ Ed. Mullach (Berlin, 1853), superseded by Köhler (Teubner: Stuttgart, 1974).

truth provides the divine form as an addition to those already well-formed by nature. We must accordingly have certain canons, briefly defined, like technical rules, for this knowledge that will make us pure and perfect, so that we might reach the goal of the good life in an orderly and methodical fashion. In first place among such canons directed towards philosophy as a whole, we would justifiably rank the Pythagorean verses that are given the epithet "Golden."

The impression given throughout the commentary of Hierocles is that it was composed specifically as a tool for beginners, using the Pythagorean poem as a text upon which to base a preparatory ethical treatise, and avoiding questions of Theology and of Philosophy.

Whatever original work lies behind the commentary of Ibn at-Tayyib, or even if, as may be, the work is the product of his own inspiration at least in part, there is no indication of any awareness that Ethics, and ethical texts, should properly be only the groundwork for further study in Philosophy; if such a limitation on the subject matter were recognized by the writer, one might expect him to avoid touching upon Metaphysics, which he does not. There is nowhere the idea that beginners only are being addressed; the pedagogic manner sometimes adopted is appropriate enough, when one considers that readers in Eleventh-Century Baghdad, even, it is likely, members of a circle such as Ibn at-Tayyib's own, would have found specific doctrines and definitions of Pythagorean, Platonic, or Neoplatonic philosophy unfamiliar, although, as Muslims, they would have found the emphatically monotheistic tone which surfaces in places in the commentary quite congenial.¹⁸

¹⁸ Muslim readers may have been confused by the attributes given to Zeus in the commentary: at 78.5 he is stated to possess exclusive unity (وَصْدَانِيَّة) is normally applied only to God), and yet at 92.10 he is declared to be "the one unique Father" and "father of souls." Although his (divine) unity would allow him to be identified with Allāh, his paternal function would not: *Qur'ān*, Sūra 112, states that "(Allāh) has not begotten, nor was He begotten."

In the commentary of Ibn at-Tayyib, questions of Theology and Metaphysics are touched upon, and there is no indication that these are restricted matters. The soul's apprehension of God, even though it is referred to metaphorically (as a "glimpse"), is out of place in Ethics: further, the metaphysical construct, the triad Being — Life — Intelligence which occurs at 12.6-7, belongs with Philosophy, not with Ethics, as does the triad Soul — Body — Possessions of 48.8-50.6, although the latter triad here has ethical relevance, as illustrating the varying degrees of value exhibited by the elements of the triad in relation to human life.

As for the triad Being — Life — Intelligence, its occurrence here does not furnish evidence that a lost commentary by Proclus may have formed the basis for Ibn at-Tayyib's work. While it is true that Proclus' system employs the triad,¹⁹ it is equally true that the same triad is found so frequently in later Neoplatonic writers that it may be said to have become a commonplace; further, there is some evidence to suggest that its development as an analysis of Being may have begun very early.²⁰

Of interest here is the striking divergence between verse 1 and the commentary, which substitutes the singular "Allāh" for the Greek plural. Mullach (p. 3, note on verse 1) says: 'Eandem lectionem fortasse exprimit interpres arabs, cuius verba sic latine reddidit Joh. Elichmannus . . . "Primum eorum quae tibi praecipio post timorem Dei ter optimi maximi, ut reverenter habeas eos quibus non decreta est mors a Deo quique eius sunt amici, ut illis honorem exhibeas eum, quem approbat religio."' ("The Arabic interpreter perhaps expresses the same reading; J. Elichmann has rendered his words into Latin as follows: "First of all those things to which I enjoin you, after the fear of God thrice best and greatest, is that you hold in veneration those for whom God has not decreed death, and also those who are His friends, so that you might show to Them the honor commended by religion.") This shift, from plural to singular, which Ibn at-Tayyib exhibits, may help to explain the at times bewildering alternation in the commentary between Allāh "God" and al-'ālihah "gods"; he may be trying to reconcile polytheism with the preferences of a monotheistic audience.

¹⁹ Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford, 1933 [repr. 1963]), propositions 101-103, and especially Dodds' notes pp. 252-253; for its frequency in the *Platonic Theology*, see Saffrey and Westerink, *Théologie Platonicienne*, Vol. I (Paris, 1968), pp. LXV-LXVI.

²⁰ Dodds, pp. 252-253; for a case for the part of the triad in Porphyry, see P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus* (Paris, 1968), especially chapter IV.

It is interesting to note that the anecdote attributed at 38.3-4 to Theano: "If I were not angry, I would beat you," was also attributed to Plato, as well as to others. Diogenes Laertius²¹ reports the anecdote in Greek as "μεμαστιγώσο ἄν . . . εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμεν." It appears that the ascription of this anecdote to Theano is found only in a work of Proclus, surviving (in William of Moerbeke's translation) under the title *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*,²² where it runs (p. 86 Boese):

Et Theana illa ad ministram dixit: si non essem
irata, verberarem utique te.²³

To conclude, there is no positive ground to support the view that Ibn at-Ṭayyib had access to a commentary by Proclus on the Χρυσῶ ἔπη, and made use of it as a basis for his own work. Until such time as further material is forthcoming, it can be said simply that the tone, compass and atmosphere of Hierocles' work do not immediately invite the suggestion that his work formed a basis for Ibn at-Ṭayyib's commentary; there is a thoroughly reverential atmosphere developed and sustained by Ibn at-Ṭayyib which may stem from a Greek original, but hardly from Hierocles. Proclus did, however, generate a reverential tone which is not discordant with Ibn at-Ṭayyib here; yet on the grounds of all the material contained in Ibn at-Ṭayyib's commentary, the only yield as to the question of its authorship is that Walzer's suggestion (p. vi, above) must be abandoned. The text as here reproduced provides no justification for assuming a palaeographical error as the cause of its attribution to Proclus, nor any convincing grounds for upholding its attribution to Hierocles.

6. *The Present Text and Translation*

The major difficulty in editing this text, apart from the problem, outlined elsewhere in this introduction, of the lack of specific identification of

words through lack of diacritics that may be relied upon, has been the availability of only one manuscript.

Increasing familiarity with the author's work, specifically in this text, though in other manuscript works also, enabled me to achieve reasonable certainty as to the identity of a word in cases where ambiguity existed: either the pointing for such words has been inserted into the text as it is here reproduced, or the word has been written without diacritics, in the critical apparatus or in the body of the text, to indicate that in my opinion some ambiguity still remains; in the latter case, I have tried to indicate the ambiguity.

There are one or two instances in the text of dittography; these have been relatively easy to recognize and to rectify; I have called attention to them in the critical apparatus.

Where there are grounds to suspect an omission which has not been immediately and automatically correctible, I have simply indicated that something is missing, and have made no effort to 'restore' the lost word or words.

Wherever I have been shown solutions to problems beyond my skill, I have tried to record the suggested solution and its originator. Most helpful in this respect have been comments from Dr Rosenthal, who has apprised me of likely omissions to the text. Such omissions render the task of working with a unique copy of a manuscript extremely difficult; at certain points, in the present text, I can be sure only of an approximate result; there may be other points at which errors occur of which I am totally unaware.

²¹ III 38, 39.

²² A. S. Riginos, *Platonica* (Leiden, 1976), p. 156, records this and other ascriptions.

²³ And the famous Theana said to her maid-servant: "If I were not angry, I would beat you."

استثمار الشيخ الفاضل أبي الفرج

عبدالله بن الطيب لمقالة

فيثاغورس المعروفة بالذهبية

تفسير برقلس

فيثاغورس من جزيرة سياموس ويقال إن

الكهانة أنذرت¹ بولده وإنه ولد من عذراء والكهانة

في إخباره سماوى من الإله فكان يجالس من الحكماء

السبعة² وليس ومضى إلى مصر والبحر وظل الحكماء

وتعلم الهندسة والأوضاع الكهانية وانتقل إلى بابل

وفاوض المنجيين والمجوس وفلاطن يقول إن تفسير

المجوسية العبادة لله وإن حكمته بلغت الغاية حتى

with - بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم - I omit the dedicatory formula which the text begins.

¹ [بالس] ² (أندرت. i.e. Ullmann retains this). أندرت¹

The learned Shaykh 'Abu 'l-Faraj
'Abdullah ibn at-Tayyib: the essentials
of the treatise of Pythagoras known as
"the Golden." Proclus' commentary.

fol. 91a

Pythagoras was from the island of Samos. His birth is said to have been forecast by prophecy, and he is said to have been born of a virgin — "prophecy" is heavenly communication from God —; it is said that he kept company with Thales, another of the Seven Sages; that he went to Egypt and the River Nile, associated with the wise men, and learned geometry and the principles of prophecy; that he went also to Babylon, where he consulted the astrologers and the Magi — the meaning of "Magism," according to Plato, is the veneration of God —; it is said that his wisdom came to be

صار إليه الحكماء من البلاد وبلغ في الرتبة من الحكمة
إلى أطراح المال وعمل الإعجاز وكان يأمر المتعلمين
أن يسكتوا خمس سنين ثم يلقنهم شيئاً من الفلسفة
والتعاليم^١ وفي هذه المدة كانوا يكسرون شهواتهم^{٩١٦}
ويصاحون نفوسهم ويتأدبون الآداب الأخلاقية
وكانوا هؤلاء الفلاسفة يذمون الصمت لترجع عقولهم
إلى ذاتها وتكون مغاوضتهم لها لا للغرباء وكان
يعرض لهم إذا فاوضوا الغير أن يتطهروا تطهراً من
تدنس بانجذاب^٢ عقله إلى خارج وكان أتباع
فيثاغورس نحو مائتين وخمسين نفساً ومن المتقدمين
فيهم كان أمبادقلس^٣ وهو واضع الألفاظ الذهبية

[امبادقلس^٣ بالحدث^٢ [والتعاليم^١

such, that wise men of all countries came to him, and that he attained so advanced a stage of philosophy as to repudiate wealth and perform miracles.

He used to command his pupils to maintain silence for five years, whereupon he would teach them some philosophy and mathematics. During this period, they would curb | their appetites, improve themselves spiritually, and undergo training in ethical conduct. These philosophers kept silence so as to allow their intellects to revert to their essential nature, and to prevent their discourse with themselves from reaching outsiders, and, should they hold converse with an outsider, they would have to purify themselves in the manner appropriate for one who had become polluted by having his intellect won over to something alien. 91b

Prominent amongst Pythagoras' disciples — who numbered about two hundred and fifty — was Empedocles, the author of the Golden Sayings.

شعرا ويقول برباعية الأسطقات ويعتقد أن كمال
التدبير الفلسفي هو تأله النفس وأن النفس إذا فارقت
البدن تصير إلى الأثير وبغير دم¹ وغير مائنة وكان
أمد قلس شديد التنسك ومحِب الطهارة
وغرض الألفاظ الذهبية أن تشوق النفوس إلى
كمالها وطهارتها وتجعل الناس² ناسا وتقودهم إلى السيرة
الحسنة والكمال يتم للإنسان بالفضيلة³ التي في الغاية
والعلم اليقيني والسيرة الفاضلة وقال قوم⁴ في
الألفاظ الذهبية إنها المرشدة إلى الحياة الإلهية⁴ والافتداء
بالله والبرؤ من الهوى وسميت ذهبية تشبيها

¹ Either َو should be excised, or a verb (e.g. تبقى) supplied.

نصير إلى الأثير ونكون: (paraphrase of vv. 70, 71) 113B
إلا فيين غير مائتين وبغير دم ولا نقبل الموت

² [الناس] ³ بالفضيلة [والفضيلة] ⁴ Rosenthal [الالهية]

Empedocles held that the elements were four, and believed that the regimen of philosophy reaches completion when the soul becomes divine, and that when the soul is separated from the body, it travels, bloodless and immortal, into the ether. Empedocles was a rigorous ascetic, and a lover of purity.

The object of the Golden Sayings is to inspire souls with longing for their perfection and purity, to make people human, and to guide them towards a proper way of life; man achieves perfection by means of absolute virtue, certain knowledge, and virtuous conduct. Some maintain that the Golden Sayings act as a guide towards divine life, the imitation of God, and liberation from matter.

They are called "golden" to make the comparison between | their purity and that of gold. 92a

لصفاها بصفاء الذلّ

أَوَّلُ الوصايا الذلّية الإخبار بأنَّ المعظمَّ أَوَّلًا

على فرائض السنة من غير المائتين هو الله فالله تعالى

هو سبب جميع الموجودات وأصل كلِّ الخيرات الموجودة

في الكلِّ ومن هذه صفته فواجبٌ تعظيمه وتعظيم

إلهه يكون بالاعتقاد الصحيح فيه بفعل¹ الخير قدامه

والاعتقاد الصحيح في الله أنه خير وواهب الخيرات

وأنه ليس بعلّة للشُرور وأنه لا يناله التغير لثبته في الغاية

والتغير انتقال من شيء إلى شيء وأنه العالم بالشيء على

حقيقته من غير أن يشوب علمه كذبٌ ففعل الخير

يختلف بحسب فاعله ومرتبته فلكل رتبة غير ما

1 Ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεός, νόμος δὲ δυνάστης

2 Τίμα

¹ HOUAN: (و) بفعل

The first of the Golden Exhortations is the reminder that, *among the immortals, the first to be honoured according to the statutes of the law is God*, for God is the cause of all that exists and the source of all the good things that are present in the Totality, and whoever is characterized by this quality must necessarily be glorified.

The glorification of God is effected by true belief in Him, and by doing good before Him; the true belief about Him is that He is good, and the giver of good things; that He does not cause evil; that He is not susceptible to change, because He is absolute, while change is a transition from something to something else, and that He is the Knower of a thing as it truly is, with a knowledge uncontaminated by falsehood.

Doing good varies according to the doer and his station, and so for each different rank there are differences in sacrifices, incense, the use

للأضرى من الذبائح والبخورات والختز¹ والحر والأعياد
 وغيرها ويتبع في ذلك وضع الأسلاف وهذه هي المسماة
 سننا وإنما وضعت مختلفة بحسب اختلاف عقول الناس
 ومذاهبهم ومساكنهم فسنة أثينة² أن يقربوا الخنزيرة
 والخنز الممزوج وأهل مصر يمتنعون من تقريب الخنازير 92b
 وهذه أصول أخذت من هرمس وهو الأمر بأن يتبع
 الإنسان سنن الآباء والأسلاف ولا يعضى مع الأشياء الغريبة
 وبحسب ميل كل أمة من الناس ووضع أسلافهم اختلف
 وضع الحكماء لسننهم في القران والأعياد والبخور ونسبوا
 أوضاعهم إلى الآلهة ولهذا إذا طالفت أمة من الأمم
 عادتها فلكت وأهل مصر واليونانيون³ ظلوا عادتهما
 وبعض الأمم يرى الصلاة إلى الجنوب وبعضها إلى

[نسخه ² supplevit Rosenthal. والخنزير ¹ والحر]

[واليونانيين ³]

of pigs and wine, and festivals, and so on, and in this matter ancestral ruling is followed; this is what is meant by "law." The reason why the rulings of the law differ is that they conform to the difference among the minds, beliefs and habitations of men: the law of the Athenians was to sacrifice the pig | and to make offerings of diluted wine, whereas the Egyptians refuse to sacrifice pigs. These are principles which were derived from Hermes, who commanded man to abide by the laws of his fathers and ancestors, and to avoid alien practices. In accordance with the disposition of each nation of mankind and its ancestral rule, the usages established by the wise men regarding sacrifice, festivals and incense vary, and they trace back these principles to the gods. This is why, if any nation transgresses against its own custom, it perishes.

92b

The Egyptians and the Greeks mingled their customs together, while some peoples think it appropriate to direct prayer toward the south, others

الشمال وبعضها إلى غير ذلك قالوا ضاع السنية تأمر
بتعظيم الإله على حسب السنن التي وضعها الآباء من تقريب
القرابين¹ والبجورات وجهات السجود وغير ذلك

والقول فيه انه غير مائت معناه أن حياته لا انقضاء لها
ولا يتغير ولا يفسد فالحياة الدائمة والوجود الدائم والعلم
بجميع الموجودات موجود له والحياة متوسطة بين الوجود

والعلم فالشئ يكون موجودا وحيا وعالما | والتعظيم 93a

لله لا يقود إليه نفعا لكن النفع يعود على المعظم له بأن

يكمل ذاته ويكون متصرفا نحو الغاية الفضلى² وكما

أن أعيننا إذا نظرت إلى الشمس لا تفيدنا نورا لكن تبصر³

توسطها هكذا تعظيم الله لا يكسبه إعظاما لكن يفيد

نفوسنا استنارة وتعظيما وإعظام النفس ذاتها بأن لا

¹ [الفصل² بيان: القرابين Text not clear; in the margin:

³ ? نبصر read نبصر]

to the north, and others in other directions, for the prescriptions of the law require the glorification of God in accordance with the regulations laid down by the ancestors concerning the offering of sacrifices, incense, the directions of prayer, and so forth.

The meaning of the statement that God is "immortal" is that He has endless life, is unchanging and undecaying, for He possesses everlasting life, everlasting existence and knowledge of all existing things; life is intermediate between existence and knowledge, so that a thing may exist, and live, and have knowledge.

| The glorification of God does not bring 93a
any benefit to Him; rather the benefit accrues to the person glorifying Him, so that he brings himself to perfection, and will proceed towards the most excellent goal; just as, when our eyes look at the sun, they do not furnish it with light, but rather see by means of it, so to glorify God does not impart grandeur to Him; instead, it imparts illumination and exaltation to ourselves. The soul's exaltation of itself consists in its being impervious to faults

تفعل من الأدناس ولا تظلم بالأوساخ بل تتصرف بحسب
النطق وتحيا¹ حياة إلهية لا تدنس إلهيتها بل تتحد ببارئها
يأمر بالتحذر من الأيمان والأيمان في قول
يقرن² به الأمر الأفضل³ ليعضد⁴ قولا مدعى ويشهد⁵ له
بالصحة والأيمان تخاف من قبل إضافة اسم الله إليها
والله تعالى يكون الإنسان عنده مكرما والله عنده مخوف
فلهذا يقع النهي عن اليمين به والتعظيم لله لأجل تصور
الفكر لجلالته والخوف منه للخبرة⁵ به ولهذا يجب أن لا
يعرض ذكره لما اتفق ولا عند أي شيء اتفق وخاصة
في الشرور والأمور الدنية لأنه يقع أن يجعله | شاهدا
على أفعالنا التي هي شرور فهذا استغفاف بجلاله وفضله
وينتقم من فاعلي هذا الفعل لتقصيرهم بالأمور الإلهية

2 καὶ εὐβου ὄρον

¹ [لغيره] ² ونشهد ³ لنعضد ⁴ ؟ نقرن ⁵ [ut saepe] وتحي

and unobscured by filth, and in its acting according to reason, living a life of unalloyed divinity, and even becoming united with its creator.

He commands us to *guard against oaths*. Oaths are statements to which is attached that which is most excellent, so as to corroborate and witness the truthfulness of a claim. Oaths are held in awe because the name of God is added to them. Now God holds man in esteem, and is feared by man, which is why the prohibition of oaths in His name comes about.

God is glorified because thought can conceive of His majesty, whereas He is feared by virtue of experience of Him. Consequently, He must not be mentioned by name at any opportunity, nor in every chance context, and particularly not in evil things nor in connection with vile matters, since it would be shameful for us to make Him act as witness | to all our evil deeds; this would be to hold His majesty and excellence in contempt, and He has revenge upon those who act thus, since they have neglected divine matters.

93b

وقد كن للقدماء أيمان إلهية¹ والأيمان إذا كانت حقيقية
وجارية على ما ينبغي فالأمور يُحترس² بها من قبل استدعاء
الأمور الإلهية للشهادة والكذب في هذه الأيمان يُبعد من
الأمور الإلهية³ ويكون الإنسان بها عبدا لشَرار الشياطين
لطاقته لهم والأيمان تكون على ضروبٍ فاصعبها أيمان الذين
يُدمون الذبائح والأسرار الإلهية بآلّا يكشفوها للأجناس
والهت في هذه قبيح ومن بعد الأيمان بالأمور المدنية
العامة التي تكون من بعض المدن لبعضٍ وذلك أن هذه يشهد
بها أصحاب المدن والمتوجهون فيهم فيعملون العقوبة للكذاب
ومن بعد تكون في المعاملة الخاصة بين الناس والصادق
في أمانه يكون قريبا من الله ويتال الخبرات أهل بيته من بعده
والأيمان الإلهية يجب أن يُحترس منها في الأيمان المعظمة

1. [الالهة] 2. [محترس] 3. [الالهة]

Nonetheless, the ancients did have divine oaths, and if oaths are genuine and proper, then the matters themselves will be made secure through them, because the divine realities have been invoked as witnesses. Falsehood in these oaths causes alienation from things divine, and through it a person is made a slave to the most evil devils for his having submitted to them.

Oaths are of various kinds: the most stringent amongst them are the oaths taken by those who perform sacrifices and administer the divine mysteries, that they will not divulge them to the impure; violating these oaths is an abomination.

Next are oaths relating to civil and public affairs, such as one city may make to another; this is because the rulers and officials of cities act as witnesses to them, and impose penalties for the perjurer.

Next are oaths occurring in private dealings between people; the man who is truthful in his oaths comes to be close to God, and his family secures benefits after him.

Care must be taken to avoid the use of divine oaths on those days which are revered.

2.3 <و> رتب الأفاضل الذين لهم عناية¹ جنس² الناس
 ثلاث الإله جل اسمه والسكينات وايراوس والإله
 هو المستولى والرئيس والسكينات هي شبيهة بالآلهة
 وخدمة لها ولا تخط إلى سيرة البشر وايراوس في
 النفوس التي جرت سيرتها مع البشر وبقيت معهم بغير
 دنس وكانت أسبابا خيراتهم وبعد انصرافها تصير إلى الحق
 وتعتلى وتكون لاصطة للأمور الإلهية والسكينات
 قريبة للاتصال بالله ولهذا تعظم تعظيما كبيرا لقربها من
 الله وتكرم ويدمج لها الذبائح ويكون ذلك دون ما يفعل
 بالإله تعالى فايراوس تعظيمها من بعد <موتها> وهذه
 تستفيد³ التأله بالحياة التي لا يشوبها دنس وتقبل الرئاسة
 بعد فراقها لجنس البشر ويخالف التعظيم لهذه التعظيم

2 εἰς τοὺς ἑρμῆς ἑρμῆς.

3 τοὺς τε κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι δυνάμεις

¹ [جنس] Haurani ² [لها] ³ [استفيد]

23 The most excellent ranks, those who are concerned | with the human species, are three: God, the demons and the heroes.

God is the Master and the Supreme Being; the demons are similar to the gods, and serve them; they do not descend into human life. Heroes are souls which have passed lives as humans, and have remained with humans without becoming polluted, and were causes of their goods. After their departure, they go to the Truth, and are elevated, and glimpse the things that are divine.

The demons are near to being united with God, and are accordingly greatly glorified because of their closeness to God, and are held in honour, and have sacrifices offered to them. This, however, is lesser honour than that paid to God, while that paid to the heroes is less again. Heroes acquire divinity in lives which have been unblemished by pollution, and receive their leading status after their separation from mankind. The honour that is paid to them differs from

للفنوس التي سيرتها ^٣ فافنا مخالفة لسيرة تلك والسنة فرضت

3 لهذه التعظيم يوما واحدا في السنة ولايرأوس في كل شهر يوما

فأما السكينات فتعظيمها دائم^١ والكريون الخادمون^٢ بها يترتبون ٩٤٦

بحسب ترتيبها في الشرف السكينات اسم يقع على النفوس

المفارقة للأبدان المتألهة في الغاية وموت أمثال هذه هو

سقوطها عن الحياة الإلهية وايرأوس إشارة إلى النفوس أيضا

المفارقة للأبدان التي كانت سيرتها جميلة إلا أن مكان هذه

أسفل ومكان تلك فوق وهذه أيضا عنده مكرمة وإكرامها

بأن يعتقد فيها أنها أبدية الوجود وأنها تسمى^٢ وتحسن إلى من

أحسن إليها وأساء^٣ ويوجب لها التعظيم والخور والتقريب

في اليوم الخامس عشر من كانون الأخير وآل فيثاغورس

يوجبون السفر البعيد إلى الموق الأفاضل للصلاة^٤ على قبورهم

وإن المجازاة تكون عن ذلك والإساءة^٥ إلى من خالفه من الله

3 εὐνοίας πέποιον.

[والإساءة^٥] [الصلاة^٤] [واسا^٣] [تسمى^٢] [داعما^١]

that paid to souls whose conduct in this life differs from theirs. For these the law prescribes celebration for one day per year; for the heroes, the regulation is for one day's celebration per month, while for the demons perpetual celebration is ordained.

The priests who are the demons' attendants | are ranked according to the status of the demons themselves. 94b

"Demons" is a name which is applied to souls which are separated from bodies, and which have attained ultimate divinity; for these, death is the lapse from divine life.

"Heroes" refers also to souls separated from bodies, whose conduct has been good, except that these are located in a lower position than the demons. Pythagoras held the heroes in esteem also, and we honour them by believing them to be eternally existent, and by believing that they requite with evil or good whoever does harm or good to them. For them there are prescribed exaltation, incense and sacrifice on the twenty-fifth day of January.

The Pythagoreans enjoin long journeys to visit the most virtuous dead, and to pray over their graves, and lay it down that God gives rewards for this, and punishes those who do not do their duty.

العلّة في أمره بإكرام الآباء لأن لهم نسبة الخالق والإله

يسمى أباً¹ ولهذا بأن نصرف الرتبة إلى مصالحهم وألا نخور عليهم

في لفظ ولا فعل ونعينهم بالنفس والبدن ونذكرهم بعد الوفاة

بكل ذكر حسن ولنجعل طاعتهم بعد طاعة الله والمجانية 95a

عليهم خرق للطبيعة وللرتبة الأبوية² وتجاوز لرسوم

السنة والعدل وتجلب سخطاً من الرتبة الإلهية وفلاطين

يحذر من دعاء الآباء وإن كان بغير عدل فضلاً أن يكون بعدل

ويوجب إكرام الأخيار لأنهم سبب الهداية إلى الأفعال

المحيلة والتودد إلى أبناء الجنس وإكرامهم لأنهم من الطبيعة

ونفعل³ ذلك معهم بحسب الاستحقاق ونألم⁴ لأنهم ونفضل

الأقارب لنا على غيرهم ونكبر⁵ البعض أكثر بسبب الفضيلة

التي جعلته خيراً ونشاركه في الحياة ونحفظ الاعتدال في فضائل

4. σοὺς τε γονεὺς τίμα, τοὺς τ' ἀγαθοὺς ἐγγεγραμμένους (ἐκ Mullach)

1. أب 2. والابوة 3. لويفعل 4. لوألم 5. ويكثر

The reason why Pythagoras commands that parents be held in honour is that their relationship is that of creator, and that God is known as "Father." This honour takes the form of our taking care of their well-being, and avoiding wronging them in what we may either say or do; in rendering them spiritual and corporal assistance, and preserving them in all good memory after their deaths; and that we should place obedience to them | second only to obedience to God. 95a

A sin committed against one's parents is a violation of nature and the parental rank, and a breach of the regulations of law and of justice, and it incurs the indignation of the divine rank: Plato gives a warning against the curse of parents, when it is without good cause, and even with good cause.

Pythagoras makes it a duty to honour good men, since they are the source of guidance to the doing of good deeds, and to show affection to relatives, and to treat them with respect, since we have them through nature. We should honour them in a measure commensurate with their merits, and suffer for their sufferings. We should give preferential treatment to our relatives as against those who are not related to us; we should also show greater honour to certain individuals because of the virtue which has made them good, and make them partners in our lives. We should maintain moderation in the virtues of both the soul and of the body.

النفس والجسم

الصديق يؤخذ¹ بالإرادة لا بالجنس ونحتاج أن نراعي

اختياره ونترز ما نستعمل معه حتى لا نجنى عليه ونحمل. إذا جرت

منه حقوة وعقد² هو وأبناء الجنس بالكرامة ونفضل أبناء الجنس

لأن وصلتهم طبيعية وجوفرية لا مكتسبة ووصلة الصديق

اختيارية ولنا أن | نطره والصداقة معقدة عند شيعة 95b

فيثاغورس وكانوا يجعلون الصداقة مثالا لاقتاد الآلهة

ولما كانت الفضائل ثلاثة نفسية وجسمية ومن خارج فيجب

أن يكون اختيار الصديق من جهة فضيلته النفسية لا الجسمية

ولا التي من الخارج ولا نطلب أن يكون موسر³ حسن الهيئة بل

من كانت نفسه عادلة فاضلة والصديق يبسط إليه الصديق 6

في أمور منزله والأشياء المحبوبة عنده ويعقد عليه في سائر

5 τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἀρετῇ ποιεῖ φίλον ὅστις ἀριστος.

6 Πράξι δ' εἶκε λόγους, ἔργοις τ' ἐπωφελέμοις,

1 2
[ويعتمد Rosenthal يؤخذ] ريب

5 Friends are to be chosen according to their goodwill, not according to kinship. We must exercise caution in choosing a friend, and be careful, in our dealings with him, that we do not do him harm; when he makes a slip, we must be tolerant, and treat both him and our relatives with deference, although we should show preference to our relatives because their connection with us is natural and essential, not an acquired one, whereas our connection with a friend is a voluntary one, and it is within our power to | repudiate him.

95b

Friendship was venerated among the Pythagoreans, who regarded it as a symbol of union with the gods.

Now since the virtues are of three types — those belonging to the soul, those to the body, and those that are external — it follows that the choice of a friend should be made from the standpoint of his virtue of soul, not of body, nor of that which is external; we should not look for a friend who is well off, nor for one of comely appearance, but rather for one possessing a just and virtuous soul.

6 Between friends, there can be frank discussion of domestic affairs and intimate concerns, and a person may rely unreservedly upon his

أحواله من غير حذر ويتنفع بمشورته وإعانتة في شدائده
والاستفادة منه بأكثر من الذهب لأجل فهمه وعدله وأمثال
فهذه من الإعانات لا يغنى فيها اليسار وحسن الهيئة لكن الفهم
وجودة الأخلاق واليسار وجودة الهيئة غير مأثورين في
بقائهما والأصدقاء الأضيار لم الذين تكون صداقتهم لأجل
الفضائل النسبية وفضيلة البدن والحال تحدث عن في
تصور الامتحان¹ والاستغفار بغيره ومن قصر فيه أحدثا فيه
ملقاً لمن فوقه والجمال البدني يفيد لذة² للمستحسن له والذي يكون 96a
في الحال يمنع من وجود العدالة على الأكثر والانفعالات
الناشئة من أجل الشهوة والغضب تفرق بين الأمور وتباعدها
والنطق جامع موحد وكان فلاطس يلتمس في صلاته ويطلب
أن يجعل الله الأسماع مشتركة والأعين والحواس ويكون القول
أن لي وليس لي سرماً³ لا معنى له³ عند الأصدقاء

[لها]³ [اسمها]² [للامتحان]¹

friend no matter what his circumstances may be, and profit from his advice and assistance when difficulties befall. The benefit which is to be derived from a friend is of a higher value than gold, in virtue of his understanding, his uprightness, and similar aids; wealth and a fine appearance are of no value in these matters, although understanding and moral excellence are, and wealth and fine appearance are, moreover, of uncertain durability.

The best friends are those with whom one's friendship is based on the virtues of the soul, whereas virtue of body and of condition give rise, in those who possess them, to the notion of superiority, and engender contempt for others, whereas they produce in those in whom they are deficient obsequiousness towards those above them.

96a

Physical beauty gives pleasure to those who appreciate it, although anyone who is in this condition is on the whole powerless to possess uprightness. The effects produced by passion and anger separate things and keep them apart, while reason brings them together and unifies them.

In his prayers, Plato used to ask and call upon God to make hearing, sight, and senses common to all. The saying "I have, or I do not have, a share" is meaningless within the context of friend-

وكان يقول إن العدل إذا كان غير موجود فالجور ليس موجود

لأن الجورة إن لم يقسكوا بقانون اتفاق¹ بينهم لم يتم

فإذا كانت الرذيلة لا تتم² إلا بالعدل فكم أولى بالفضيلة الداعية

إلى الألفة وإعادة النفوس إلى الحال التي كانت عليها قبل مقارنة

الأبدان وبالواجب قيل إن الفضيلة الباعثة على اختيار

الأصدقاء هي³ متبقيت وهما⁴ لا يرد⁵ حكمه

وصيث الفضيلة أكثر فالصداقة أؤكد والذي يظهر منه

صحة⁶ صيحة⁷ في الفضيلة⁸ فهو الوثيق المودة ولا ينبغي

أن نلتبس⁹ من الصديق كثرة الكرامة لنا فهذا يضعف¹⁰

الصداقة واللينة ربما فرقت الصداقة إذا ثقل¹¹ استعمالها

من الصديق والفضب المفرط يحمل¹² رباط الصداقة وإن

احتمله الصديق دفعات¹³ والمؤاساة والمساواة في القول

¹ [اتفاق] ² [يتم] ³ MS here repeats ditto graphically:

أكثر بالصداقة أؤكد والذي يظهر منه صحة¹⁴ صيحة¹⁵ في الفضيلة (96b)

⁴ [يلتبس] ⁵ [ضعف] ⁶ [ثقل]

ship. Plato also said that if there were no justice, there could be no injustice either, since if the unjust could find no standard upon which to agree, injustice could not be actualized, so that if injustice can only be realized through justice, then how much more worthy is the virtue which arouses congeniality and causes souls to revert to the state in which they were prior to their attachment to bodies! It is rightly said that the virtue which prompts one to choose friends is an alert instigator, and a judge whose verdicts are incontrovertible. And the more abundant is the virtue, the more stable will be the friendship, and anyone who exhibits a genuine ardour for virtue will be a staunch friend.

| We ought not to expect much from a friend 96b
in the way of respect — this would arise from a defective friendship —; and pleasure too will sometimes disrupt a friendship, if indulgence in it is burdensome to one's friend; excessive anger can also dissolve the bond of friendship, even though one's friend may tolerate it repeatedly. Instead, it is sharing one's worldly possessions, and placing one's friend on an equal footing with oneself, both

والفعل تثبت الصداقة فالصداقة هي تأليف كتأليف الموسيقى
 ووافق¹ فإذا ارتفع ذلك ارتفعت الصداقة وعسر الانقياد جدًّا²
 صنف من الشر وسهولته تدعوا³ إلى الملوك والاعمال للصديق
 والانقياد يفعل ما أدى إلى غاية محمودة وإذا أحسن الصديق
 إلى الصديق يجب أن يعتقد نفسه مقصرًا وإذا أحسن صديقه
 إليه فيجب أن يُعْتَدَّ له غاية الاستعداد فهذا كبر نفس
 وبالجملة لا ينبغي أن نستكثر ما نفعله معكم ولا نلتمس الممحة
 من جهنم بل نعترف لهم بالفضل ونجعل الغاية بيننا وبينهم استفادة
 الصداقة⁴

7.8 وهو يأمر بالآل نفع الصديق بسبب الجانيات اليسيرة

بل نصبر له وتواضع للاحتفاظ بصداقته ونسب ذلك منه إلى

7 Μηδ' ἔχθαιρε φίλον σὸν ἀμαρτίας εἶναι μικρῆς,

8 ὅφρα δύνῃ.

¹ جدًّا ² يدعوا ³ MS follows with : نستكثر ما نفعله الخ
 أن the words الخ appear vertically in the margin; after
 there is the sign of an omission √ (as also on folios 109b, 110b).
 للصداقة⁴

verbally and practically, which render friendship enduring, for friendship is a harmony like musical harmony, and a concord: if the harmony is destroyed, the friendship is destroyed.

Too little pliability is a fault of a kind; too much of it leads to flattery, but tolerance of the friend and pliability produce the wherewithal for progress to a praiseworthy end.

When someone does his friend a service, he should consider himself as having been deficient; when, however, his friend does him a service, he should be given the greatest credit for it; for this is magnanimity. On the whole, we should not begrudge what we do for friends, nor expect gratitude from them, but rather should acknowledge their goodness. We should make it our aim, in our relations with friends, to act in a way that is beneficial to the friendship.

7.8 Pythagoras commands us not to drop a friend because of trifling wrongs: instead we should bear with him and be humble in order to retain the friendship; we should ascribe such actions

ضعف الطبيعة البشرية | فارتفع الخطأ هو لطبيعة أعلى من
 طبيعة البشر ومتى انتقلنا¹ عن ذلك رجعنا باللوم على
 نفوسنا ونفعل ذلك خاصة مع من قدم عهد صداقته
 وصغير الجنايات التي لا تطرح الصداقة من أجلها ما كانت
 في الأمور العالمية كالأموال والمنازل عند الملوك والأشياء
 الحادثة بالبحث فهذا لا ينبغي للصديق أن يعتقد عداوة
 صديقه في الغاية إن دفعه عنها فهذه الأمور عند ذوي
 العقول صغيرة جدًا فأما الجنايات الكبار فهي² الأفعال التي
 يفعلها الصديق مع صديقه فينسب لأجلها إلى الشريك أن
 كان يظن به أنه خير والأشياء التي تبعد من الله وتسقطه
 ومن يقودنا إلى مثل ذلك يجب أن نهرب منه فربنا من

شر الأعداء

[وهي²] [انفعلنا¹]

on his part to the infirmity of human nature, | since the removal of error is for a nature that is higher than that of man. And since we are removed from that, we place the blame upon ourselves, and we should do this particularly in cases where our friendship with someone is of long standing. Minor wrongs, which would not warrant the termination of a friendship, concern worldly things such as property, preferment by rulers, and things that are the result of chance. If one can turn one's friend away from such errors, one should not regard him as ultimately a foe, for intelligent persons consider these matters to be extremely trivial.

Major wrongs are actions because of which the person who inflicts them upon his friend is regarded as a vicious man, when previously his friend had thought well of him, and doings which cause alienation from God, and arouse His anger; we must flee from anyone who would induce us to behave in such a way as we would flee from our worst enemy.

8 وفيثاغورس يقول إن القوة قريبة من الضرورة

والقوة يشير بها إلى شدة النفس وامتناعها من الانطباع

للافعالات والضرورة يشير بها إلى الحياة الدائمة فإن

97b الحياة الدائمة ثابتة لا تتغير ولأجلها تجري أفعالنا على موجب

العقل وبسببها يفعل الأخيار الخيرات فالشيء الذي يعسر

انفعاله يناسب ما لا يتغير وضعف النفس يؤدي إلى الحياة

البائدة واقتناء الحال الأولى يقربنا من الطبيعة الإلهية والثانية

تبعدنا منها

9-11 فيثاغورس يأمر بالصبر عن النوم والبطنة والشبق والغضب

لأن هذه انفعالات صادرة عن القوة الشهوانية والغضبية إذا

خربنا ولم نض على سنن العقل وبترك هذه تتم رتبة الحياة

8 δύνκμε γὰρ ἀνάγκης ἐγγύθει καίει.

9 κρατεῖν δ' εἰθίξας τῶνδε.

10 γαστρὸς μὲν πρῶτα, καὶ ὕπνου λαγναίης τε

11 καὶ θυμοῦ.

8 Pythagoras says that *potential* is close to *necessity*.

By "potential" he is referring to strength of soul, and its imperviousness to passivities; by "necessity" he means perpetual life, because perpetual life has permanence and is unchanging, and because of it our actions | follow the requirements of intellect; it is the reason why good men do good actions, since what is resistant to passivities is related to what is unchanging. On the other hand, feebleness of soul results in a transitory life; possession of the former state brings us close to the divine nature, while the latter distances us from it.

9-11 Pythagoras enjoins *abstention from sleep, gluttony, carnality and anger*, because these are reactions arising from the faculties of appetite and anger, when we deviate from the norms of intellect instead of adhering to them. It is by the rejection of these reactions that we realize that life

97b

الخاصة بنا وتكون نفوسنا البهيمية منقاداً للتصرف النطقي
 وهذه الانفعالات تنمي بنمو المزاج وتنقص بنقصانه فمن الواجب
 قمع الشهوانية والغضب حتى لا تكدر (أ) الأمر الإلهي وتجذبه إلى
 خلاف طبعه فالخروج عن الاعتدال في المأكل والمشرب والطبيعة
 جعله¹ لضرورة الحياة يشبه فيه الأمر البهيمي وبالجملة التقنن²
 في هذه والسرف في الكم والكيف يخرجان عن حد تصرف النطق
 فينا وتكون سيرتنا بحسب اللذة لا بحسب الحاجة والحاجة إلى المأكل
 98a إنما ينبغي أن تكون بحسب قوام البدن والحياة لإخلاف عوض التحلل
 وإذا تدبر الإنسان استهان بتقنن ما يوضع بين يديه من
 المأكولات وأخذ حاجته وعدل بالباقي إلى غيره ويحب كثرة النوم
 لئلا تصيربه كدنيات ويم³ التصرف الحيواني والنطق يتصرف العقل
 بتوسط الحيوانية والحواس ويكون على ضد ما عليه الآلية من أن

1 ومث 2 [يكون 3 [النفس 4 [جعلته

5 [وعدم

which is properly ours, and our bestial souls come to act rationally.

These reactions increase and diminish with the growth and decrease of temperament; it is therefore vital that we subdue our passionate and irascible parts, so that they will not make turbid the part which is divine, and attract it to what is alien to its nature, since immoderation in food, drink and matters of nature cause it, by virtue of life's necessity, to resemble when it engages in these things, the bestial part.

In general, variety and extravagance in quantity and quality result from our overstepping the bounds of rational behaviour, which is present within us, and lead us | to conduct ourselves so as to follow the dictates of pleasure, rather than of need.

As regards food, our needs should be only so much as will sustain the body and life, to compensate by replacement for what has been dissipated. When a person does this gradually, he comes to think little of the variety of food that is set before him, and will take what he requires, and distribute the remainder to others. He will avoid sleeping much, so that it does not render him like a vegetable, bereft of animal and rational functions through the intellect's operation through the medium of the animal faculty and of the senses, and so become the opposite to the gods, in that they are

أيقاظ لا ينامون ولا يحتاجون إلى الاستراحة فالنوم غير لائق
 بالنطق وعائق عن تصرفاته والكفر تفسيره مقرب الذبائح
 والخين¹ بسبب خطايا الشعب ويقال إن ثور² لما غضبت على
 حاد³ لها قالت لولا أنني غضبي لأذيتك فافاكم على الأمور العقل
 وهو الذي يفسح الغضب أن يبيع في الوقت الذي ينبغي وأن يرى
 مرمى الكلب الذي يهر إذا فسخ له صاحبه في الربر فأما نفسه
 على غير هذا الوجه فليس من الواجب هذه القوة الوصائية تخضع
 بحسب العقل المؤدب لها ولأن الغضب ثورانه عن مزاج البدن
 ما ينبغي أن يكسر سورة³ الأغذية والحرارة المطبقة بمواضع القلب
 ومنها ينشأ الغضب فكما كسرت القوى البهيمية يكون العقل
 أشد ضبطا لها وكما أن أهل المدينة إذا مضوا مع اللذات
 والشهوات أدت ذلك إلى سخط الخالق عليهم فكذلك البدن إذا مضى مع

PROCLUS De decem dub. circa prov. 86 BOESE Et Theano illa ad
 ministrum dixit: si non essem irata, verberarem utique te.

¹ [والخين] = ΘΕΛΩΝ WESTERINK

³ [شوره]

alert and unsleeping, and have no need of rest, since sleep is incompatible with reason, and a hindrance to its operations.

The meaning of a "pagan priest" is one who performs sacrifices and acts of atonement for the sins of the people.

It is said of Theano that when she was angry with one of her servants, she told the servant "If I were not angry, I would hurt you": since it is intellect which has control over things, and which gives anger licence to erupt at the appropriate moment, and to behave in the same way as does a dog: when its master permits it to howl, it may do so freely, but anger must not be permitted in any other circumstance.

This brutish force submits according to intellect, | which keeps it under control. Because anger originates out of temperament, it must not be permitted to break through the confines of food or the warmth surrounding the heart, for it is from these that anger arises, and whenever the bestial powers are subdued, intellect's grip on them becomes firmer. In the same way as the people of a town will incur the Creator's anger when they indulge excessively in pleasures and passions, so the body's excessive indulgence in pleasures brings

الملذات أدّى هذا إلى سقوط العقل عليه لأنه يمضى مع
 الشهوات التي لا تقتضيها السُنّة ولا الطبيعة وينقاد إلى شهوة
 الجور التي لا شفاء لها وهذه الأشياء إذا طرحت بتدرج
 أدّى أطرافها على هذه الصفة إلى تركها بالكلية بالتشاكل
 بالأشغال العائقة عنها وتلطيف الأغذية التي ثقل معها
 الفضول وكان آل فيثاغورس يستعملون الأنان
 الحُرنة لرفع هذه الشهوات وضامة وقت النوم حتى لا يبقى في
 التخيل آثار تزعم في المنام وطبيعة الشهوة أمرٌ مضلل للعقل
 وجاذبٌ له إلى البدن ويفارق بها [إلى] الحياة الإلهية وإذا
 قويت | افترست العقل كالسبع وطئنت بأن الحق عبداً وفي 99a
 يدبها وفي الحقيقة أن لذات الأبدان استراحات من ألم لا
 لذات فبالواجب قبلها أن تال الطبيعة إلى الأمر الخارج عن

down upon it the anger of the intellect, because the
 body has indulged appetites which neither law nor
 nature require, and has succumbed to the craving
 for debauchery, which is insatiable.

If these desires are gradually shed, this
 way of discarding them will culminate in their
 total rejection, by means of one's busying oneself
 with concerns which discourage them, and by at-
 tenuating foods which entail heavy waste.

The Pythagoreans used to employ melan-
 choly music to subdue these appetites; they did
 this particularly when it was time for sleep, so as
 to ensure that there remained in the imagination no
 impressions which might disturb their sleep.

It is the nature of appetite to mislead the in-
 tellect, and to draw it towards the body and cause
 it to lose contact with the divine life, and, when
 once it has the power to do so, | it will pounce
 upon the intellect like a beast of prey; and you
 might suppose that the truth is its slave, and under
 its control, whereas the truth of the matter is that
 the sensual delights of the body are not really
 pleasures, but respites from pain. So it is reasonable
 that first nature should tend towards something

that is alien to its character, so as to have pleasure in being brought back again.

The force of anger is like a wild beast, and it is hard for the intellect to keep it under control; because of anger, insolence and uncouthness of verbal expression exercise influence, and the bonds of intellect are severed. The eradication of this habit is facilitated by habituation and the restriction of sleep is facilitated by limiting the intake of food and by habit.

There is no need for adultery or for over-indulgence in sex, as there is for sleep and food, and we ought to accustom ourselves to their rejection, so as to preserve ourselves from them. We should flee from depravity, and take as a motive the sense of shame before ourselves, because, like shame before others, shame before ourselves can be a forceful restraint against wrongdoing, while the fear of God is the chief restraint. A man's shame of himself prevents him from doing wicked things. This is not something alien to him, but both religious law and the intellect prescribe it.

¹³ Pythagoras insists that *moderation be observed* | in both action and speech. He calls this "justice" because there is in it a beauty for the soul, that we be moderate in what we do.

99b

طباعاً حتى تلذ بالإعادة والسورة الفضبية كالسبع الوحشي
 وضبط العقل لها يصعب ويجذب لأجلها القوة وفطاطة اللفظ
 وتقطع رباطات العقل وزوال هذه العادة يعين عليه الاعتياد وقلة النوم
 يعين عليه قلة الغذاء والعادة والزناء والإفراط في الجماع لا
 ضرورة إليه كالنوم والغذاء ويجب أن نألف تركه لحفظ منه
 ذواتنا ونهرب من القباح ونجعل العلة استحياء¹ من نفوسنا فاستحياء²
 من نفوسنا كاستحياء³ من غيرنا يمنعنا بالقرين من الغطاء وأكثر أسباب
 الامتناع الخوف من الله⁴ فحياء الإنسان من ذاته يمنعه من فعل القبيح
 وليس هو شيئاً خارجاً عنها والشرعية والعقل يوصيان بهذه
 الوحشية

99b فيثاغورس يأمر باستمرار الاعتدال في الفعل والقول
 ويسمى ذلك عدلاً لأن فيه جمالاً⁵ للنفس أن تكون أفعالها

13 Εἴτα δικαιοσύνην ἵσκειν ἔργῳ τε λόγῳ τε

¹ [استحياءاً] ² [فاستحياءاً] ³ [كاستحياءاً] ⁴ [للإنسان]

⁵ [شيء] ⁶ ? فإن ينبغي An omission here, such as

معتدلة وجسب الرأي المشهور إن الحسن ما مدح الناس عليه
والقبح ما ذموا بسببه وفي الحقيقة إن الحسن ما أتبع فيه الجزء
الناطق والقبح ما أتبع منه الجزء غير الناطق فالقبح والحسن
صقائق في طباعهما وكذلك الخير والشر لا يكونان في الحقيقة
جسب اعتقادنا فإن القبح في نفسه لو وصفه واصف عشرة ألف
مرة بأنه حسن لما أخرج به قول الواصف له من أن يكون قبيحا
وإذا كان القبح أمرا¹ في نفسه فكذا فينبغي أن نتجنبه لعينه
لا لأجل حضور الناس بل نخرس ذواتنا من قباضته حضروا أو
غابوا فاستحياء الإنسان من ذاته أولى به من استحيائه من غيره
وبالمجلة الاستحياء من العقل الموجود أولى من الاستحياء من
كل شيء وبالمجلة جميع الانفعالات البدنية يجب أن نجعلها
كخادم بين يدي الملك كالغضب والشهوة وغيرها ولا نلکها

¹¹ πρήξις δ' αἰσχρόν ποτε μήτε μετ' ἑλλου,

¹² μητ' ἰδίῃ πάντων δὲ μάλιστα αἰσχύνει σκυτόν.

¹] امر

According to the common view, "good" is what brings people praise, while "evil" is what earns them reproof. In fact, "good" is that with respect to which the rational part of us is followed, while "evil" is that with respect to which the irrational part is followed, so that evil and good are things which truly exist in their own right. In the same way, goodness and badness do not owe their objective reality to our believing that they are real, for if someone were to say ten thousand times that evil is good, merely saying it was so could never cause it to cease being evil, and since evil is something real in itself, we must in the same way avoid the thing because of what it is in itself, not because there may be others present, but rather we must preserve ourselves from its evilness, whether others are present or not. Hence a person's shame before himself is more worthy of him than shame before all others, and on the whole shame felt before the intellect that is there is more worthy of him than is shame before anything else at all.

Generally speaking, we should make all bodily reactions like a servant who serves a king, reactions such as anger, appetite and so on, and we should not allow them to act as they please.

اختيارك فكذا أن الغضب والشه والشبق قبيحة فكذا القنوط 100 a

والكسل والظلم وجميع أفعال النفس غير الناطقة التي هي انفعالات

بدنية وكما أن الهوى قبيحة في نفسها فكذا الانفعالات الكائنة

فيها قبيحة في نفسها فأما آداب العقل وفضائله فهي المستحسنه

المقومة والعدل في القول من دون الفعل أمر فارغ لا

يُنفع به والأقاويل الرديئة إذا صدرت من الأخيار جرت مجرى

مكرات منزلة مدح غير الشبيه وذم الشبيه فالعادل ينبغي أن

يقسط أقواله وأفعاله ويعطي على كل واحد ما يستحقه ويعمل

العدالة نصب عينه لأنها حاكم عدل ويكون ما نفعله مع ذواتنا

شبهنا بطاعتنا لا غريبا منها وألا نهرب من الحق بوجه من

الوجوه ونلتصق لأصدقائنا مثل ما نلتصق لنفوسنا ونفعل

أفعال العدالة على الكمال بأن نكون أعفاء وشجعان وصحاء

Now just as | anger, gluttony and licentious- 100a
ness are evil, so too are despondency, idleness, op-
pression and all activities of the irrational soul
which are bodily reactions; and just as matter in it-
self is evil, so are the reactions which arise within
it evil in themselves; but the morals and virtues of
the intellect are commendable and worth treasuring.

Justice that is merely verbal, without being
put into practice, is a useless thing, bringing no
benefits, and vile words coming from good men
are shocking, like praising what is not praise-
worthy, and condemning what ought to be praised.
Hence a just man should be just in what he says
and what he does, and should give every individual
what he deserves, and should make justice his main
concern, since it is an impartial referee.

We should ensure that our dealings with
ourselves are in keeping with our natures, not
foreign to them, and we should not shrink from
the truth on any grounds whatever. We should
also seek to obtain for our friends the same as we
should hope to attain for ourselves, and we should
make our actions those of perfect justice, by being
temperate, courageous and wise, and by giving

ونوفى الله صقه والطباع التى فى أعلى متّا والأسلاف والأقارب
والأصدقاء ونحبّ الأضيّار لذوانهم لا لكيما يحسنوا إلينا ونجنب
100 b الأشرار وإن لم يضرّوا بنا ولا نمنع الأضيّار واجبهم جسدياً ولا
نمدح الأشرار خوفاً منهم

وفيتاغورس يأمر بأن نعتاد أن تكون أفعالنا مع روية

ونتمسك بشرائط العقل ونعتاد التمييز للغير منها من الشر

والأفعال التى تكون مع فكرٍ هى سيرة إنسانية ومع غير

فكرٍ هى سيرة بهيمية ويؤكد الحثّ على استعمال ما قاله

15,16 لينبه عقولنا وإشعارنا بأن طبيعة أبداننا مائة ومقتنياتها

فاسدة فنجعل العناية بهما بقدر ما يستحق أن يُعنى بالمنقضى

البائد وخصّص دين¹ لأن أكثر حرص الناس البرهيمين من أجلهما

والفضلاء إما عنايتهم بما يخصّ النفس لأنها من غير المائتين وبالبدن

14 μηδ' ἀλογίστως σκυτὸν ἔχειν περὶ μηδὲν ἐπιζέ.

15 ἡ δὲ γυνὴ μὲν ὡς θανέειν πέπρωται ὥπασιν.

16 χρήματα δ' ἄλλοτε μὲν κτᾶσθαι φιλεῖ, ἄλλοτε δ' ὀλέσθαι.

1 LAHOOD وخصص (اللتشين اشارة) لأن دين

God His due, and giving due to the nature that is higher than our own, to our ancestors, our relatives, and our friends, and by loving those who are good, for themselves, not in the hopes of receiving favours from them; and by avoiding vicious people, even though they may do us no harm; and by not keeping from good people what they deserve out of envy of them, not praising the wicked out of fear of them.

14 Pythagoras instructs us to *accustom ourselves to accompany our actions with reflection*, and to adhere to the stipulations of the intellect, and to make it a habit to distinguish between good actions and bad.

Actions that are undertaken together with thought represent the way human beings behave, while to act without thinking is the way animals behave.

15,16 He is giving emphasis to his command that we put his instructions into practice, to alert our intellects and to make them realize that our bodies are by their nature mortal, and our bodies' possessions perishable. We must therefore concern ourselves with them only to the extent that is appropriate for that which is transitory and subject to extinction; he refers specifically to these two things because the main desire of bestial people is for them, whereas virtuous people are concerned solely with what is proper to the soul, because it is numbered among immortal beings, while they have only a secondary concern with the body, which

من بعد بحسب ما يستحق لأنه من المائنة وبالمقتنيات من بعد لأنها

في الرتبة الأخيرة إذ كانت من الأشياء الخارجية وليست داخلية

فيما به قوامنا ويكون ما نفعله في ذلك بحسب مقتضى النطق 101a

والتأديب لا بحسب عادات الناس التي يعضون فيها على جهة غير

نطقية فإنهم يرون أن العناية بالقضايا عظيمة ثم بالجسم ويكد أن لا

يشعروا بقضايا النفس

17-20 فيثاغورس يأمر باحتمال الآلام الطارئة على جهة الاتفاق والآ

نكث الاستصعب لها وهداواتها بحسب الإمكان والاعتقاد بأنه ليس

قسط الأضرار منها كبيرا والجمهور على ضد هذا لأنهم ينسخطون

عند حلول الأشياء المادية بهم عن الاتفاق كما مرض وفقد القضايا

والأهل والخصول في الأزمان الصعبة وهذا العالم يشبه

17 ὅσσα τε δαιμονίῃσι τύχαις βροτοὶ ἀλγε' ἔχουσιν.

18 ἣν ἂν μοῖραν ἔχῃς, ταύτην φέρε, μηδ' ἀγανάκτη.

19 ἰσθαι δὲ πρέπει, καθόσον εὖνῃ· ὥς δὲ φράξεν.

20 οὐ πάνυ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τούτων πολλὴ μοῖρα δίδωσι.

is as much as it deserves, inasmuch as it is in the mortal category, and their last concern is with possessions, since they come into the final category insofar as they belong to the class of externals, and do not enter into that class of things which are essential for our sustenance. Regarding the latter category, we should treat them | as the requirements 101a of intellect and proper behaviour dictate, not according to the habits of men, to which they cling irrationally; for they regard possessions as deserving the most exclusive attention; only then do they attend to physical concerns, while they are virtually oblivious of the possessions of the soul.

17-20 Pythagoras tells us to *tolerate the sufferings which befall us through chance, without taking them too hard, but to alleviate them as far as we are able, and to be assured that the portion of them that falls to good men is not a large one.*

The majority of people do the opposite of this, in that they become resentful when afflicted by chance calamities, such as illness, loss of property or family, or the setting in of hard times.

The world resembles a city, in which there

is an ancient king, sitting unalterably, and the priests come after him, and follow and resemble him; and then come the souls, whom the Father has brought into existence, giving them birth, and has arranged for them to act according to their own free choice. As a consequence of their exercising this freedom of choice, they are given rewards or punishment by the rulers. These souls are subject to fate, and reward or punishment for their having been affected more by this life, or by the life to come.

Fate has its origin in the first rank, | the heavenly, and in its motions. It is owing to fate that the span of one person's life is attended with suffering and struggle, while that of another is filled with pleasure and delight. Consequently we must accept with equanimity the fate that falls to our lot.

The coming of fate to us is the result of the generated bodies and of freedom, which is to say, of heavenly motions and those of ourselves; we should not therefore become annoyed because these things happen to us, nor should we suppose that they befall us because we have deserved them; instead we should behave rationally, so as to be able to accept the gift of those who gave us life. We must not think, either, that the gods are responsible for injustice, but should believe that sickness and

مدينة¹ فيها ملك على قدم الأيام جالس لا يتغير وأخبار² بعده
يتبعونه ويتقيلونه والنفوس من بعدهم التي أوجدوا الأب مولدا
وجعلها تتصرف على اختيارها ولأجل اختيارها ينالها الجزاء
والعقاب من الرؤساء ولهذه يفرض البخت والجزاء والعقاب بها
ثلاثا من هذه < الحياة أو في الأخرى والبخت⁴ صادر عن الرتبة
الأولى السماوية وحركاتها ولأجل البخت صارت مدة الحياة⁵
مقرونة بالألم والتعب⁶ وللبعث⁷ باللذة والطيب ولهذا يجب أن
نقبل ما يتفق لنا من ذلك بسكون والبخت يكون لنا من الأجرام
الكائنة ومن الحرية⁷ أعني من حركات السماء ومن حركاتنا فلا ينبغي
أن نتسخط لأجل طروق هذه لنا ولا نظن أنها حصلت لنا باستحقاق بل
تتصرف التصرفات النطقية لتقبل العطاء من والي الحياة لنا ولا
نعتقد أنه يكون من الآلهة جور وأنها لا تقصد بالمرض ولا بفقر ولا

¹ مدينته ² وأخبار ³ Possibly an omission here.

⁴ والبخت ⁵ الحياة (للبعث) مقرونة ⁶ ⁷ والبخت

⁷ الحرية ⁸ الحرية. Possibly an omission here.

غيره ونتشيع عند حلول الشدائد بنا ولا نخضع لها ونعتقد
سهياً ويجب أن نعود في الطارئات علينا إلى السبب الشافي لنا من
فقرٍ ومرض وغيره فبالقوة الفكرية المميّزة للأشياء خصصنا من دون
الحيوان الباقي وإن كانت العناية أعطتها خواصاً تصلح بها أحوالها
ولكن على جهةٍ محدودة لا جهة متفنة¹ والصنائع التي اكتسبنا
معرفةً من الآلهة معينة لنا في الشدائد الطارئة علينا في حياتنا
فلأنا أجزاء لهذا الكل نفعل في حياتنا بتقلباته وبما معنا من
القوة الفكرية شفى أنفسنا وقلّ ما تكون البحوث الرديئة
للأخبار لأجل طهارتهم وتقبضهم من هذا العالم الذي يحدث فيه
الاتفاقيات ولهذا يجب أن نحرص على التأدب الذي نصير به أخبار
لنتخلص من هذه الآلام الطارئة على الأكثر فعدم التألم أعلى من
الطبيعة البشرية ولعلّ قلّة ما يلحقهم من ذلك إشارة إلى

¹ [؟ سعيّة]

² [ينحل]

poverty and so on are not divinely premeditated, and be courageous when hardships afflict us, and not give in to them; we should regard them as something coming from lots, and when we are afflicted, take refuge in the means of our salvation from poverty, illness and the rest. For the capacity to think, which distinguishes among things, sets us apart from all other animals, even though Providence has provided them with special qualities with which to improve their lot, but in a limited, not a versatile, way.

The skills, the knowledge of which we have derived from the gods, are of help to us in the hardships that beset us during the course of our lives, for, since we are parts of this Whole, we are affected throughout our lives by its upheavals, although, by virtue of the capacity for thinking which we possess, we are in a position to heal ourselves.

The good are seldom given a bad fate, because of their purity and their withdrawal from this world, in which the happenings of chance take place. For this reason we must strive for the education which renders us good, so that we may rid ourselves of these sufferings which overtake the majority of people, since to be impervious to pain is beyond human nature; perhaps the fact that good people are but little touched by it is an indication of

102a

استهانتم بما يطرأ من موت وفقر وعذاب وفقد مدح لم ولأصدقاء لم
فركت الدوريات ومقلها به بتقلب ما تحت الفلك ولأجله ما يكون
النجت والاتقان لجميع ما تحت فلك القمر

21-23 فيثاغورس يأمر بترك الالتفات على أقاويل الحمد والذم

وا احتمال التكذب بعد أن يكون الإنسان في نفسه بريئاً من سائر

102b فإنما لما وجب علينا أن نصبر على الفيرات والشور الطارئة علينا

وفي أمور فكذا يجب أن نصبر على الأقاويل الكاذبة والصادقة

الطارئة علينا وفيها ونعرف ما وقع منها موقعه وما لم يقع موقعه

والصحيح من السقيم والكذاب يجب إرشاده فإن سمع وإلا فالتباعد عنه

25,26 وإظهار كذب أقاويله بالطف طريق وبالجملة يجب أن تكون أقاويلنا

وأفعالنا على جهة حسنة فاضلة لأن حسن التصرف بالفعل فكذا

21 Πολλοὶ δ' ἀνθρώποι λόγοι δειλοὶ τε καὶ ἐσθλοὶ

22 προσπίπτουσ', ὧν μὲν ἐκπλήσσει, μὲν δ' αἰσθῆς

23 ἀργεσθαι αὐτόν· ψεύδος δ' ἥνπερ τι λέγεται,

24 πράως εἶχ'.

their disdain for the occurrence of death, poverty, torment and the loss of their own or their friends' reputations. For it is the cycles of the heavens and their fluctuation which generate inconstancy throughout the sublunar world, and this fluctuation produces the uncertainties of fate and chance which befall all that exists in that world.

21-24 Pythagoras commands us to *disregard expressions of praise and blame, and to be tolerant of falsehood*, when once one has become free within oneself from all these things. For since it is our duty | to bear calmly the fortunes and misfortunes 102b which befall us, which are real things, we must in the same way be patient in the face of false and true statements which affect us, and distinguish between them, and recognize which of them are apt, and which inappropriate, and distinguish the sound from the faulty.

When someone is untruthful, we must correct him; if he is willing to be corrected, well and good; but if he is not, we must keep our distance from him, and expose his lies in the gentlest way. In 25,26 general, we must keep to what is good and virtuous in the things we say and do, because correct be-

haviour in our actions requires it. We are also obliged to be cautious in what we say and do, to exercise judgment over it, and to hold fast to what is just and good. The cause of error in this is faulty application of the power of judgment, which scrutinizes what is said for falsehood and truthfulness. People who do not use judgment properly are deceived by what sounds convincing, and the cause of thought's being led astray from the ideal procedure is the pleasant. Pleasure is the only reason why the multitude abandon virtue, and is the cause of their lack of a rational mode of behaviour and of their disdain for what is most excellent; | instead, 103a they prize honours, possessions, authority and power, and show a disinclination for the divine life, being more in sympathy with the earth-bound life. There are many who lapse from a state of excellence while giving credence to plausible sophisms which remove them from the realm of liberty and bring them to that of servitude. So a free soul will not deviate from excellence by any stratagem or for any pleasure, not even if every kind of delusion is placed in its way.

27 He instructs us to *deliberate about what we intend doing before we do it, so that our action will not*

يقتضى ويوجب الاحتراز في الأقاويل والأفعال وتبهرها لتتسك¹

بالذى قومنها عدل وخير والضلال في ذلك يأتى من سوء تصرف

القوة المميّزة الفاحصة عن الأقاويل الكاذبة والصادقة وأمثال

قؤلاء يجتدعون بالأقاويل المقنعة والذى يصرف الأفكار عن

السلوك في الطريقة المثلى الأمر الملائم فالجمهور إنما يفارق الفضيلة

لأجل اللذة ولأجلها يعدمون التأدب النطقى ويستبينون بالشئ

الأفضل ويعتدون الكرامات والمقتنيات والسلطان والقدرة 103a

ويميلون من الحياة الإلهية إلى الحياة الأرضية وكثيرون ينحطون

من الخال الفاضلة في الاعتقادات بأقاويل سوفسطائية تقنعهم وتخرج

بنفوسهم من صدّ الحرية إلى صدّ العبودية فالنفس الحرة لا تنصرف

عن الأمر الأفضل بخديعة ولا لذة ولو نُصبت لها كل الضلالات

ويأمر باستعمال المشورة في المفعّل قبل فعله حتى لا

27

27 Βουλευέου δὲ πρὸ ἔργου, ὅπως μὴ πρὸς πλεῖστην

¹ [لتتسك

be one done in ignorance, or be evil or devoid of sense, and so that there may be no harmful consequences.

By the capacity to deliberate we are distinguished from dumb animals, because they act out of compulsion, whereas our actions are the product of choice — and if they were not, what would be the use of deliberation? Deliberation gives service in our perplexities, although when we employ it, there is no guarantee that we will achieve our object, but at times obstacles may intervene. For this reason he says that deliberation is a gift, given to the soul, which is beneficial when it is perplexed as to what to do, and the actions it performs will profit from pure thought and deliberation.

103b | Thought takes place when a person puts his own intellect to use, while deliberation occurs when he has recourse to someone else's intellect, over what course of action to take, what benefit it will lead to, the time and the place for doing it, and the devices whereby he will effect the action.

28 Anyone who acts without deliberation is a wretch, whose actions are those of an animal. People of this kind frequently have cause for regret because they fail to achieve their desire and goal, and their hopes are dashed, and they fall into great calamities;

يكون الفعل الذي يُفعل على جهة الجهل والقيح وعلى غير جهة النطق ولا

تكون¹ عواقبه مضرّة والمشورة أمر نقيض به من الحيوانات غير

الناطقة إذ كانت أفعالها اضطرارية وأفعالنا اختيارية وإلا

فالمشورة فإذا تنفع والمشورة تنفع في المزمعات من الأمور

وليس لا محالة² يبلغ معها الفرض لكن قد تفوق عوائق ولهذا ما

يقال إن المشورة موفقة للنفس تنفع في المزمعات مما نفعل والأفعال

103b التي نفعل ينتفع فيها بالفكرة³ الصافية والمشورة | والفكرة باستعمال

الإنسان لعقل نفسه والمشورة باستعانته بعقل غيره فيما يفعله وإلى

أى فائدة يؤدى وفي أى زمان وأى مكان وبأى أداة يصل إلى ذلك

28 الفعل والإنسان الذي يفعل فعله بغير مشورة هو الشقي الجارى

في أفعاله على جهة بهيمة وأمثال هؤلاء يكثر تندّم لأنهم يقفون

عند غير البغية والطلب وتحيب آلامهم ويقفون في شروء عظام

28 δειλοῦ ται πρήσσειν τε λέγειν τ' ἀνόητα πρὸς ἀνδρός.

Rosenthal ينتفع فيها بالفكرة [ينفذ بها في الفكرة ³] تلح ² [يكون ¹]

والأفعال التي تكون بتقسيطات العقل وموجباته لا يتقدم فاعلها
البتة وإن لم يبلغ إلى الغرض بموافق ولا يتعرض مثل هذا لما لا
يصل إليه ولا إلى ما لا يدركه ولا يتقدم على ما فات إذا لم يقدر
عليه لأنه قد تقدم بالتمييز العقلي (ف) تعلم أنه لا يدركه

30,31 يأمر بأن يتقدم الإنسان فيعلم ما يريد أن يفعله ويتعلم الأشياء

النافعة التي إذا كان عارفاً بها تكون سيرته جميلة مفردة والقوة

الإلهية التي فينا في العقلية وهذه إذا تصرف الإنسان بحسبها لم يخطئ 104a

في أفعاله البتة وتكون أفعاله خيرات كلها ويكون مجداً للقوم العارفين

والفعل الذي يكون على غير بصيرة عقلية يشبه مسالك العمى فينبغي

أن نقف في الضياء الخاص بطباعنا وفوق العلم ثم نفعل أفعالنا في أوقاتها

وأزمانها وكما أن الطبيب لا يجوز منه التعرض للفعل في طبيعة

البدن من غير علم به فكذلك الأفعال العقلية لا ينبغي أن نصدرها إلا

30 πρῆσσε δὲ μηδὲν τῶν μὴ ἐπίστασαι, ἀλλὰ διδάσκει

31 ὅσσα χρεῶν, καὶ τερπνότατον βίον ὧδε διέξεις.

whereas actions that are performed according to the apportionments and requirements of intellect do not occasion the least regret to the person who does them, even though he may be prevented by obstacles from achieving his goal. Such persons do not run the risk of taking on actions which are impossible or unattainable, nor do they regret failing at something beyond their grasp, because it would have been impossible for them, since they will have previously exercised intellectual discernment, and so discovered that they would have been unable to achieve it.

30,31 Pythagoras commands that one must *begin by finding out what it is one wishes to do, and learning what are the useful things a knowledge of which will make one's way of life singularly beautiful.*

The divine faculty within us is that of the intellect; | if a person bases his actions upon this, 104a he will never err in his actions, and all his actions will be good ones, and knowledgeable people will hold him in esteem. However, an action that is not accompanied by intellectual insight will be like the groping steps of the blind; hence we must possess the illumination which is peculiarly our own, and that is knowledge. Then our actions will fall at the appropriate time. Just as it is inconceivable that a doctor who knew nothing of physiology would be allowed to practise it, so we must not embark upon any action involving the intellect without previous

بعد تقدّم علم بها ليسرنا فعاله ولا نتندم عليها

32-34 ويوصى بمراعاة صحة البدن بأن يكون ما نتناوله من الأغذية

والأشربة معتدلاً وكذلك الرياضات والمعتدل هو الذي لا يؤلم

35 ويوصى بأن يكون الغذاء بسيطاً غير مركّب وهذا لأن البدن آلة

للنفس فيجب أن تقع العناية لتكون تصرفات النفس على ما ينبغي

فكما أن النفس موقوبة من الآلهة كذلك البدن لا ينبغي أن

يُفسد مواهب الآلهة لذلك تكون شراراً لا أمانة لنا والبدن 104 b

العقل عسر الانقياد للنفس فلماذا ينبغي أن تُحفّز والعناية بالبدن

بالزيادة والتنقيص والتنقيص لفضلاته والزيادة بالإخلاف لما يجل

عنه الأول بالرياضة والثاني بالغذاء والأغذية يُراعى اعتدال كميّتها

بالأثر يزيد ولا تنقص عما ينبغي حتى لا تثقل أو تعوز فتجلى قوة البدن

32 Οὐδ' ὑγιαίνει τῆς περὶ σῶμ' ἀμέλειαν ἔχειν Χρή·

33 ἀλλὰ ποτοῦ τε μέτρον καὶ σίτου γυμνασίων τε

34 ποιεῖσθαι· μέτρον δὲ λέγω τόδ', ὃ μὴ σ' ἀνιήσκει.

35 εἰθίγου δὲ δάκτυλον ἔχειν καθάρειον, ἄθροιστον·

knowledge of it, so that we may be delighted by what we have done, rather than regretting it.

32-34 Pythagoras exhorts us to *give attention to the health of our bodies, by being moderate in our consumption of food and drink, as well as in taking exercise; the moderate amount is that which does not cause harm.*

35 He recommends also that *food be simple, not elaborate.*

This is because the body is a tool of the soul, and hence must be treated with care, so that the soul may function properly. For just as the soul is a gift from the gods, so the body must not corrupt the gods' gifts, | in case they become a 104b liability to us rather than a safeguard.

A body that is bulky will follow the soul's lead only with difficulty, and therefore we must make it lean.

The care of the body is by means of supplement and reduction — reduction to eliminate waste products, and supplement to restore what is eliminated; the first process is effected by exercise, the second through nutrition. Moderation should be observed in the quantity of food that is taken, whereby neither more nor less is taken than is required, so that we become neither corpulent nor emaciated, which would destroy the body's strength.

والغذاء المتنن الفليظ يضر بالقوى الطبيعية ويكدِّها كدًّا عظيمًا ويهلب
 الأمراض والبسيط¹ لا يكدِّها والنقى يُثير² الروح ويهذب الفكر ولهذا
 صارت حياة المياسير مُكدرة بالأمراض ويمرصون على صيد الحيوانات
 والسمك ويقتنون الصناعات في إفلاكها ويفتنون ألوان الطبخ بسبب
 الشهوة البهيمية حتى أنهم يذلون لمن يصلحها لهم ويدارونه ولا يؤدبون
 أولادهم في هذا المعنى بل يُنشونهم عليه والوصبة الفوثاغورية ضد
 ذلك لأنها توصي في الغذاء ببساطته⁴ ونقاؤه وأكثر | الأغذية الخفيفة
 105a الحمل في من غير المتنفس لتأكله وإن ظنَّ ظانٌّ أنه ينبغي أن نقتدى⁵
 بالمتنفس لتأكله⁶ فليكن من مستنشق الهواء

ويأمر بالطراح الجسد⁷ لأن الحياة المبرأة من الجسم ألد من

36 καὶ πεφύλαξό γε ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὅπως φθόνον ἔσχει. (!)

¹ والبسيط ² يثير؟ [سرى] ³ ويقتنون [ويعسون] ⁴ ببساطته ⁵ نقتدى
 earlier in the line.

⁶ MS here repeats, ditrographically: وإن ظنَّ ظانٌّ أنه ينبغي أن نقتدى
 بالمتنفس

⁷ الجسد (= φθόνος) One would expect

Food which is varied and coarse impairs the natural powers and burdens them severely, and brings on diseases, while simple food does not burden them, and pure food stimulates the spirit and disciplines the thoughts. This is why the lives of prosperous people are vexed by disease, and why they are bent on hunting animals and fishes, and acquire skills in killing them, and develop dishes so elaborate, at the prompting of bestial craving, that they humble themselves to anyone who improves them for them, and flatter him; nor do they punish their offspring for this attitude, but rather rear them in accordance with it. But Pythagoras' admonition runs contrary to this, in that it advises that food be simple and pure. Most | foods that are easily digested by the eater come from inanimate sources, and those who believe that we ought to nourish ourselves on food that is animate, are being foolish.

16 Pythagoras commands that we *reject the body*, because to those who possess intelligence, a life of freedom from the body is sweeter than

105a

التي تكون مع الجسم عند ذوى العقول فالحياة مع الجسم مضطربة ومع
غير الجسم ساكنة لذينة والحياة الجسائية تضى مع اللذة والفجر
والعجب والزجيم وأمثال هؤلاء يجتهدون تزيين نفوسهم بكثرة
المقتنيات الهولائية والمطرح لهذه لا يسرع إليه الحسد لكن يُحمد
وربما حُسد لأجل الحمد وحُسن السيرة يكون حُسن المشاركة
للناس والاعتدال في المعاملات وحسن اللقاء وحُجبل السيرة
ولطافة اللفظ والإعانة للغير وأتد نذكر الزلل الذي زلّ فيه
الإنسان وأمثال هذه لا يُحسد الإنسان عليها وما يجذب إليه
الحسد كثرة المقتنيات والرئاسة والسلط في السياسة | والمثاله 105b
هو الذي يبعد من هذه الأمور ويطلب الخيرات التي هي بالحقيقة
خيرات وهذه لا يحسد أهل العالم من أجلها لأن الحسد انفعال من
الانفعالات الهولائية ومن أعرق في الفضيلة بكاملها فأقل الفضائل

with it, since life with the body is subject to agitation, while without it life is calm and delightful. The life of the body involves sensual pleasures, debauchery, pride and aggression, and those who follow it try to improve themselves by amassing material possessions, while one who rejects the life of the body is not readily envied, but is rather praised, although he may perhaps be envied the praise he receives. Good conduct is to be achieved through co-operating well with people, through moderation in dealings with them, good social comportment, courteous behaviour, grace of speech, and helpfulness towards others; further, by not reminding people of slips they have committed: characters of this sort are not envied by people; what makes a person envied is abundance of possessions, prominence and political power.

| The divine man is one who is aloof from 105b such concerns, and who seeks the good things that are truly good. These things do not excite the envy of ordinary people, because envy is a material reaction, and a person who is thoroughly steeped in

المزرفة لا يحسدونه

37,38 فيثاغورس يأمر بأن لا نبذر المقتنيات على جهة غير مهيمة في

غير أوانها ونتمسك بها إلى حدّ فلاعتدال في كل شيء جميل

والمقتنيات تُعدّ خيرا في الرتبة الثالثة فلهذا لما تكلم في خيرات النفس

والجسم انتقل إليها وفيها يكون الحسد والتعبد لها والتمسك بها قبيح

وتبذيرها أيضا قبيح في أي وقت كان فإن تبذيرها لا يكون إلا لأجل

الشهوة والمحور الاتفاق على ما ينبغي وفي الوقت الذي ينبغي ومع من

ينبغي ولا يقع شراهة في المأكولات والمشروبات والتمسك بالمال عاشق له

بعينه كما قد يعشق الإنسان البخورات وغيرها والمبذر أعذر من التمسك

لأن هذا يزول عنه حد العطا والإفضال | والاعتدال محبوب عند الطبيعة 106a

لأنه مفيد الكمال لكل شيء

ويأمر بفعل ما لا يضرب والارتقاء قبل الفعل والتمييز بين

37 Μη δαπανᾶν παρὰ καιρόν, ὅποια καλῶν ἀδαήμων.

38 μηδ' ἀνελεύθερος ἴσθι· μέτρον δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστον.

39 πρῆσσε δὲ ταῦθ' ἃ σε μὴ βλάψει· λόγισαι δὲ πρὸ ἔργου.

¹ [المحوراب]

perfect virtue will not be envied by those whose virtue is spurious.

37,38 Pythagoras instructs us *not to squander what we possess improperly and unseasonably, nor to be excessively niggardly with what we have, since moderation in all things is best.*

Possessions are accounted as a good of the third class; after he has discussed the goods of the soul and those of the body, he goes on to talk about these goods, which are the object of envy. To be enthralled by them, or greedy for them, is disgraceful, as it is also to be wasteful of them at any time whatsoever, since prodigality arises only from cupidity, whereas the creditable course is to conform to the appropriate measure, the proper time, and with individuals with whom it is appropriate; it is correct also to avoid gluttonous consumption of food and drink. A person who clings fast to his money is infatuated with money itself, in the same way as someone else may perhaps be addicted, say, to incenses.

However, the wastrel is more excusable than the niggard, because the latter is no longer able to give gifts or render favours.

| Moderation is beloved by nature because it 106a gives all things perfection.

39 Pythagoras tells us *to do that which is not harmful, and to consider before we act, and to make*

الخيرات والشؤون العقلية والفكرة رئاسة يدخل تحتها جميع

الفضائل العملية فجعل غاية العفة ضبط الشهوات والشجاعة والاستعداد

للقاء الأمور المخوفة واستعداد ودود الموت فمن الواجب أن يموت

<ومقارنة>¹ أفعالنا مع فكر جيد نأمن به عواقب رداءة فيها

وكذا أنا يجب أن نفكر في أفعالنا قبل أن نفعلها فكذلك ينبغي أن نقرن

إلى الفكرة المشورة فيها حتى لا نستضر بعواقبها باتباع شهوة أو غضب

٤٥-٤٤ ويأمر بالآد ينام الإنسان إلا بعد تصفح أفعاله التي مضت له في

يأمر ثلاث دفعات حتى يعلم ما تجوز فيه فيزجر نفسه بسببه وما

أحسن فيه فيبرج به وآل فيثاغورس كانوا يجتثون على التأدب

الذي يضبط النفس ويقرها عن الانبساط في الأمور البدنية

٤٥ Μηδ' ὕπνον μαλακοῖσιν ἐπ' ἄρμυσι προσδέσθαι.

٤١ πρὶν τῶν ἡμερινῶν ἔργων λογίσασθαι ἕκαστον.

٤٢ πῇ παρέβην; τί δ' ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη;

٤٣ ἀρξάμενος δ' ἀπὸ πρώτου ἐπέλθει· καὶ μετέπειτα

٤٤ δευτὰ μὲν ἐκπρήξας ἐπιπλήσσο, χρηστὰ δέ, τέρπει.

There is an omission in the MS here.

a distinction between good and bad among the things of the intellect.

The supreme authority rests with wisdom, and all the practical virtues are subsumed under its head, for it makes it the goal of moderation to control the passions, and courage, and readiness to confront the things which frighten us, and renders tolerable the fact that death will come to us — for it is certain that we shall die.

When we act in conjunction with sound thought, this preserves us from evil consequences, and just as we ought to think about what we are going to do before we do it, similarly we must combine thought with deliberation concerning it, so as to avoid damaging consequences as a result of being swayed by passion or anger.

40-44 Pythagoras commands that *no-one should sleep until he has examined three times all that he has done during the day, in order to discover where he has transgressed, and scold himself for it, and what was correctly done, and congratulate himself upon it.*

The Pythagoreans used to recommend a discipline which gave them control over themselves and restrained them perforce from indulging their physical urges.

٤٥ ويأمرون بالحمية ففيها| عضد للقوة الناطقة على الشهوانية

ويستعملون عند المنام الألمان التي تزيل الخيالات الرديئة من النفس

ويفكروا فيما فعلوه نهاراً وما كانوا يطلقون النوم عند طلوع الشمس

لئلا يطلع واهب النور والحياة ولم نياماً فالإبطال لفعل ليس بفضيلة

وفكروا فيما مضى نهاراً ليس لأنهم يستدركوا الفائت لكن حتى لا

يفعلوا مثله وأن يستأنفوا من الأفعال ما قد اختبروا الجيد منه

من الرديء وزجر النفس لذاتها لئلا تعود إلى جوفها وتفكر في

أفعالها ولا تحتاج إلى آخر يذنبها كالنائمة

٤٦ والفعل لهذه الأمور الموصى بها يبلغ بالإنسان إلى نحو الفضائل

الإلهية والكد والحرص والامتحان للأفعال تؤدي إلى جودة التأديب

٤٥ والحبّة تخلص النفس الناطقة والعفة لغير الناطقة والفضائل

الإلهية هي الوصول إلى العلم الإلهي والتأمله في الأفعال لاقتناء الحياة

٤٥ Ταῦτα πόνει, ταῦτ' ἐμμελέτα· τούτων χρὴ ἐρεῖν σε,

٤٦ ταῦτά σε τῆς θεῆς ἀρετῆς εἰς ἴχνη θήσει.

They used also to insist upon fervent zeal, because it furnishes | an ally for the rational faculty 106b to combat the power of passion.

For the period of sleep, they would employ music such as would purge the soul of malignant fantasies, and they would think about what they had done during the day. They used not to countenance sleeping at sunrise, so that the giver of light and life should not rise while they were asleep, for there is no virtue in nullifying any action.

The reason for their thinking about their daytime activities was not to regain lost opportunities, but in order to avoid repeating what they had done, and so as to resume those of their activities which they would discover by testing them to be good, as distinct from the bad.

The soul's rebuking itself was so that it would revert to its true self and reflect upon its actions, and not need anyone else to awaken it as though it were asleep.

Putting these admonitions into practice brings an individual near to divine virtue; effort, striving, and examination of one's actions result in excellence of manners. Love is peculiar to the rational soul, whereas moderation properly belongs to the irrational soul.

The "divine virtues" are the attainment of divine knowledge; and divinity in one's actions is for the purpose of acquiring everlasting life and

الدائمة والوصول إلى السعادة العلية العلية التي بها يُنْصَل بالله

107a

ومن وصل إلى هذه الرتبة فهو الخير في الحقيقة

47,48 وفيثاغورس يحق ما قاله وأنه على ما قاله بالقسم الذي

منح النفس المادة الرباعية من الطبيعة التي لا تسكن وليس إنما خالف

ما وصى به في النهي عن الأيمان لكن فعل هذا تحقيقاً وتأكيذاً وحشاً

على استعمالها وهذا مبالغة ومن الناس من كان يعتقد ف

فثاغورس أنه إله ومنهم من كان يعتقد أنه إنسان وكان يقسم به

أهل زمانه لتأله وبلوغه أقصى المنازل في الفضائل الإلهية

وفيثاغورس جعل الأعداد مثلاً ورموزاً على الأمور الإلهية لاسيما

العدد الكائن من الواحد إلى العشرة ويرفع كلٌّ منها إلى سبب غير ما

الأخر ويوجب له من الفعل غير ما يوجب للآخر والعشارية هي

المعاملة عنده للعالم وإنما جعل القسم بالرباعية من دونها لأن

47 καὶ μὲ τὸν ἑμετέρη ψυχῇ παραδόντι τετρακτὺν,

48 πᾶσαν θεοῦ φύσεως.

realizing exalted intellectual felicity, whereby we may be united with God; anyone who has attained this | stage is truly good.

107a

47,48 Pythagoras substantiates his claim — and does so in a manner compatible with his teaching — with the oath “*By Him who has given to the soul its fourfold substance of unabating nature.*”

He is not, in taking this oath, violating his own precept in which he prohibits oath-taking; rather his reason for taking the oath is by way of verification and confirmation, and to encourage the implementation of his oath: it is done as a rhetorical hyperbole.

There were people who were convinced that Pythagoras was a god, while others regarded him as a mortal. His contemporaries used to swear an oath by him, because of his godliness, and the fact that he had attained the ultimate station in the divine virtues.

Pythagoras regarded numbers as symbolic images of divine realities, particularly the number which is composed of the units from one to ten; he ascribed to each different number a different cause, and postulated for each of them a different activity. In his view, tenfoldness was the maker of the world, and the reason for his citing, in his oath, fourfoldness, rather than tenfoldness, is that Empedocles, who composed these sayings,

taught a doctrine of four elements: he held that they were the source of the world and of nature.

Alternatively, he may have made fourfoldness the subject of the oath because tenfoldness is contained in it: for the first number symbolizes God, because he possesses perfect unity, and if any number were to be added to unity, the resulting number would then have been, according to the Pythagorean system, a representation of the secondary divinities, since they reserved unity exclusively for Zeus, whom they called by that name.

They named Athene by threefoldness, and Apollo by sevenfoldness, and did similarly with the other numbers.

The first numbers are characteristic of the gods, the second represent the intelligible forms that are found in all that exists, the third are representations of soul, since Pythagoras held that souls are directed by the Father, who caused them to be born out of numbers, while the fourth are representations of natural objects, in keeping with matter and its ordering by form; and since there are four categories of numbers — divine, intellectual, those of soul, and natural numbers — the last category of numbers is rightly located in the fourfold number.

Some have accounted for Pythagoras' favouring fourfoldness on the grounds that it corresponds to the number of seasons in the year,

مدون الألفاظ الذببية امبادقلس كان يقول برباعية الأسطقست

107b وأنا أصل العالم والطبيعة | أولن عدد العشارية منظو في الرباعية

فأول العدد إشارة إلى الله تعالى لأن له الوحدانية الخاصة وإذا

أضيف إليه عدد آخر كان صور الآلهة الثواني على ما يقولون فإنهم

يفردون الوحدانية لراوس ويسمونه يا ويسمون اثينا بالثلاثية

والا بلون بالسباعية وهكذا في غير ذلك والاعداد الاول إنما في سمات

الآلهة والثواني في الصور المعقولة التي في الموجودات والثالث في

الصور النفسانية لأنه يجعل قوام النفوس الألب المولد لها من الأعداد

والرابع صور الأشياء الطبيعية إلى حسب الهيولى ورتبتها

بالصورة وإذا كانت مراتب الأعداد أربعة العدد الإلهي والعقلي

والنفساني والطبيعي فبالواجب يكون آخر الأعداد في الرباعي

وقوم يستدلون على تفضيل العدد الرباعي لأن عليه عدد

فصول السنة وحسبه عدد الحيوانات - فنها سماوية ولوائية ومائية

108a وأرضية - وعدد الفضائل أربع - الحكمة والشجاعة والعفة والعدل -

فالموجود بدأ من الواحد الإلهي وانتهى إلى الرباعية الطبيعية

فالرباعية إذاً من بين العدد خاصة بالعشارية التي في الكمال

وبالواحد الذي هو المبدأ فقسمة بالرباعية لأنها خاصة بنا

فتقدير الكلام "وحق والهب ينبوع الاربعى" < > الذي به

كأننا وواقبه هو الواحد وإنما خصنا بالينبوع الاربعى لأنه كال -

إذا العشرة فيه - ولأن فينا طبيعة العقل والنفس الحيوانية

والنباتية والطبيعية

48, 49 فيتأغورس يأمر عند الدنو من العمل أن يقع الابتها إلى

الله في تكيله وأنت فينبغى أن تعلم أن العلوم المؤدية إلى الأعمال

إنما لم يقرن بها العمل صارت لفظاً ساذجاً لا معنى له¹ فسمعنا

48

ἀλλ' ἔρχου ἐπ' ἔργον,

49

θεοῖσιν ἐπευξόμενος τελέσει.

¹ [لجه

or to the number of kinds of animal — for there are celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrestrial animals — or because the number of virtues is four: | wisdom, courage, moderation and justice. 108a

The existents thus began with divine unity, and ended with the natural number four, and consequently fourfoldness is, of all numbers, most peculiarly associated both with tenfoldness — which is perfection — and with unity, which is the beginning, and so he swears by fourfoldness because it is a number characteristic of ourselves.

Thus, the true meaning of the expression "Yea, by the giver of the fourfold source" — is tenfoldness wherein is our perfection, and its giver who is One. The reason for his associating the "fourfold source" specifically with us is because it is perfection — since it contains ten — and because we contain the natures of intellect, of animal and vegetable soul, and a physical nature.

48, 49 Pythagoras commands that *when activity is contemplated, a prayer be made to God, that He bring the action to its completion.*

You must realize that every kind of knowledge which is effectively practical must necessarily be combined with practice, if it is not to be mere meaningless verbiage; for when we give credence

للفضائل ينبغي أن نقرن به عملاً حتى نكون متمسكين بها على ما ينبغي

ونطرح سائر الشهوات البدنية ونعتضد بالتأييد الإلهي في المعونة

على ما نلقاه من الجهاد ولا نكون كمن قال إنني لا احتاج إلى الصلاة 108b

والابتهاال لبلوغى الفضيلة وغلطوا لأن الذى يكتسب الوجود والفضيلة

من آخر فيجب أن يبقى أبداً متمسكاً بذلك الآخر ولأن ما سوى

الله فهو < يكتسب > عنه ما يحتاج في الكمال إليه وإن بلغ غاية

الفضيلة

وفيثاغورس يعلمنا أن المتمسك بهذه الأوامر ينتهى إلى 49-51

المراتب الإلهية وقد تقدم فأعلمنا أن الفضيلة هي في صحة الاعتقاد

في الآلهة وجميل الرأي في أيراموس وفي حرمة النفوس والإكرام

للمولدين والحرص على الإفضال على الصديق والمناسب واستعمال

49

τούτων δὲ κρατήσεως.

50

γνώσεαι θανάτων τε θεῶν θνητῶν τ' ἀνθρώπων

51

σύστασιν, ἣν τε ἕκαστα διέρχεται ἣν τε κρατεῖται.

to the virtues, we must also combine this with practising them, so as properly to abide by them, and reject all bodily passions; and we must seek divine aid to help us in our exertions, rather than act as do those who say "I do | not need to pray or beseech, because I have already attained virtue." 108b People who say this are misguided, since whatever derives its existence and its virtue from a source that is other than itself, must cling everlastingly and unceasingly to that other source, and because all except God needs Him for its perfection, even though it may have attained the acme of virtue.

49-51 Pythagoras informs us that *anyone who perseveres with these commands will ultimately reach the divine ranks.*

He has pointed out previously that virtue consists in correctness of belief about God, in having appropriate respect for the heroes and for the inviolability of souls, in honouring one's parents, in striving to render favour to one's friends and relatives, and in practising justice and sound

العدل وجودة الرأي والخير الواصل إلينا من ذلك هو الوصول إلى
 الفضيلة الإلهية بالعلم والاتصال بها بأن يعلم العقل وجود الأمور
 الإلهية والإنسية وكيف كن وجود الآلهة متقدمًا وكيف وُجد البشر
 عنها وأن الآلهة أعلى من العالم وفي العالة بنفوسنا وليس كل فعلٍ
 يليق بها وكيف رتبها وحركاتها ودورانها | وكل غاياتها فيما دون
 ١٠٩٨ أو فيما فوقها وأن البشر منه جسماني وغير جسماني والجسماني
 أداة لغير الجسماني وكيف يخاطب غير الجسماني الجسماني وكيف ينفرد
 عنه وكيف تكون مرتبته بعد الانفراد وكل يبقى في العالم العلوي أبدًا
 أو يعود نازلًا والعقول إذا تفلسفت بلغت إلى درجة أنفع وإلى
 كمالاتها الخاصة بها والأدرون أبدًا يبلغ إلى رتبة الأعلى ويقف فله
 حركة في الفضيلة ووقوف في الرتبة الإلهية وعلى مذهب
 أمبادقلس الوقوف هو الذي يكون عن المحبة جمع الطبيعة واحدة

judgment; and the good that will accrue to us through following these injunctions is that we shall attain to divine virtue through knowledge, and our knowledge of it will be such that our intellects *will discover the existence of both divine and human realities*, and learn how *the gods are prior*, while *human beings owe their existence to them*, and how the gods are exalted beyond the world, and have knowledge of the souls which belong to them; we shall come to see that not all activity is worthy of them, and we shall learn about their ranks, their movements and their rotation, | and whether their goals are lowly or more exalted; that a human being has a corporeal part, and a part that is incorporeal; that the corporeal part is an instrument for the incorporeal, and the way in which the incorporeal part is associated with the corporeal, and in what sense it is detached from it; the rank it possesses, once it has detached itself, and whether it remains for ever in the upper world or comes back down from it.

109a

When intellects philosophize, they reach a stage that is more beneficial, and attain their respective perfections. A more lowly intellect can always attain a higher rank, and stay there, for it is able to move in terms of virtue, and to station itself at the divine level.

According to the system of Empedocles, rest is the product of Love's binding all nature into a

والحركة تعلبه الغلبة بانتشار الواحد إلى الكثرة ولما كانت طبائع

الآلهة بسيطة ومتشابهة وغير منكثرة فيأتها بالبساطة والحيوانات

غير الناطقة لما كانت مع الكثرة والارتباط فيأتها كذلك

والإنسان وهو متوسط بالعقل والجوهر الإلهي يدخل في البساطة

109b والتأخذ وبالبدن في التركيب | والتكثير والظلمة فالطبيعة غير

النقية لا تتوقع العلو إلى الأعلى فليس لها في طبيعتها والطبيعة

العلوية لا تنحط إلى الأسفل فليس لها في طبيعتها فأما الطبيعة الإنسانية

فلا ينبغي أن يجذب الأعلى فيها بمقارنته الأسفل البتة لكن ينبغي أن

53 يجذب الأسفل إليه ولا تطلب ما هو أعلى مما قدرته فمن عرف ذاته

التمس لها مقدار ما يستحقه حسب والأمور الخاصة بنا والتي هي

جوهريتنا فلنا أن ننصرف بحسبها وقد (يكون في) قدرتنا البلوغ إليها

فأما الأشياء التي تكون بالبحث كاليسار والمنزلة عند السلطان وطول

53 ὥστε σε μήτ' ἐλαττ' ἐλπίζειν,

single entity, whereas motion comes about when Strife gains the upper hand by the dissolution of Unity into Multiplicity. Now since the gods have simple, homogeneous natures, rather than manifold ones, their lives are simple, whereas irrational animals are tied up with plurality and articulation, and live accordingly; whilst man, being in an intermediate position, partakes, in virtue of his intellect and his divine essential nature, in simplicity and unity, and, by virtue of his body, in compositeness, | multiplicity and gloom. It is not to be expected that an impure nature will be elevated to the topmost heights, because to do so would be uncharacteristic, nor is a celestial nature likely to sink to the lower levels, for it is not in its nature to do so; but concerning the nature of a human being, that which is higher in it must never be dragged down through its being in association with the lower; instead, it should draw the lower towards itself.

53 Nor should anyone try to achieve anything that is beyond his powers, since someone who knows himself will strive only after that to which he is entitled. We must be active with respect to the things that are properly our concerns and which constitute our true nature, since it may be within our power to attain them; whereas things that come about by chance, such as prosperity, positions of authority,

54 العز فليست إلينا فلا ينبغي أن نحرص فيها وسوء البخت الكائن للبشر

عن اختياره المؤدى إلى سقاء وبه عدوله عن الخيرات القاصية بذاته ووقوعه

في الشرور السهلة عليه الوقوع فيها ونفس الإنسان لأن لها حركة

إرادية واختيارية تصرف¹ بأن تعلو وتخط بإيثارها ولها أن تختار

السيرة المحمودة والمذمومة ولهذا يختلف محلها إذا تصرفت بالكون | فوق 110a

الأرض وتحتها والنفس المتصرفة بحسب النطق تحيا في الخيرات

حياة إرادية وتنعم (و) إذا تصرفت بحسب الغضب والشهوة تحيا

حياة الشر وتنال العقاب الدائم وتحصل في الظلمات الهيولانية ولا تقايط

الخيرات الإلهية والعقل ولوبصر النفس والعقل الداني من الشرور مثل

بالانفعالات الهيولانية والعقول ما دامت مع الهيولى فإنها تستنير

بالإلهيات كاستنارة النائم في الشمس ولولا يعلم حتى إذا انتبه وانكشفت له

صوابه شاهد ما شوفيه والعقل المتخرج بالفضائل يحفظ لظنا يسيرا أنه

يتنقل من الشرور والذي يجعل العقل بهذه

54 γνῶσις δ' ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρώπου πρὸς ἑαυτὸν

55 τλήμωνας

1 [يتصرف] 2 [متقل]

and longevity are beyond our control, and we must not therefore desire them.

54 *Ill fate comes to human beings as the result of their making choices that lead to unhappiness, and which deflect them from the good things that are proper to them, and which throw them into calamities into which they readily fall. Because the human soul is capable of motion resulting from will and choice, it can so behave as either to rise or to sink, as it may prefer; and it has the choice of following either a praiseworthy or a reprehensible way of life, and consequently its position will vary according as it has acted by the world | above the earth, or 110a that below it.*

A soul which has behaved rationally will live a life of free choice among good things, while if it has followed anger or appetite, it will lead a miserable life, and be subjected to everlasting punishment, and will end up among the gloom of what is material, with no share in the divine goods.

When in the proximity of vices, the intellect — which is the soul's eye — becomes burdened with material reactions. Now as long as intellects remain connected with matter, they are continually being illuminated by the divine beings, in the same way that someone may be sleeping in the sun, and not realize it until he awakens, and recovers his senses, and sees for himself the situation he is in. An intellect which has been educated by means of the virtues can

الصفة هو العلم فالنفس إذا شعرت تؤثر حلّ رباطها من الهيولى وإذا

جذبها الهيولى إليها لم تؤثر حلّ الرباط والوقت الذي تؤثر فيه حل

الرباط هو الوقت الذي تطرح فيه اللذات البدنية كالفواس والكرامات

واليسار والسلطان والنفس المستحقة لذلك هي التي تكون معتقة من 110b

58 الشرور وقد يربط النفس بالشر الهوى أيضاً ولأن الشرور اختيارية فهي

تقضى بلا نهاية والعقول الإلهية وإن كانت اختيارية فركتها دوراً

بالانعطاف على ذاتها فأما نفوس الناس فتتحرك على الاستقامة فإنها تقضى

هو الشهوانية والفضيية وتأت بها إليها وبالأول تكون مستعبدة وبالثاني

مستعبدة وإذا انجذبت الناطقة من الشهوانية لا تكون متتارة بل مقهورة

ومتصرفة تصرفاً سبغياً

59,60 فيثاغورس ينهى عن العداوة فإنها مفسدة ومؤلة

58

ἀπειράνα πῆματ' ἔχοντες.

59

λυγρὴ γὰρ συνοπαδὸς ἐπὶ βλάβτουσα λέληθε

60

σύμφυτος, ἣν οὐ δεῖ προάγειν, εἰκόντι δὲ φεύγειν.

see quite clearly that it has been dissociated from evil things, and it is knowledge which imparts this quality to intellect.

When the soul becomes aware, it will prefer to dissolve the bond which ties it to matter, but when matter drags the soul along with it, it will not choose to dissolve the bond; the moment at which the soul chooses to break the connection is the moment at which it casts aside bodily pleasures such as sensual gratification, honours, wealth and authority. Any soul which has | freed itself from 110b vice is entitled to make that choice. Sometimes, too,

58 passion may bind the soul to vice. And since vices are the objects of free choice, they may go on endlessly.

Although divine intellects have freedom of choice, still their motion is circular, because they incline fondly towards themselves. The motion of human souls, however, follows a straight path, since they tend towards the appetitive and the irascible, and draw these powers towards them, and become subject to the one, and subject to the other.

When the rational soul submits to the attractive influence of the appetitive soul, it forfeits freedom of choice and becomes subject to coercion, and behaves badly.

59,60

Pythagoras forbids enmity, because it is pernicious and causes suffering.

وامبادقلس¹ يعتقد أن فينا محبة وغلبة وبالفلبة نتشتت ونتفرق
ونلقى المولات وبالمحبة نتأخذ ونلقى الميزات وبالمحبة نعلو وبالفلبة نسل
ووقوعنا في الشرور الاختيارية عندما نخطئ إلى أسفل ويرد العقل إلى
عالم الكون ونضرب الفكر ونجعله بطالاً من ضيراته الخاصة به وإذا حصل
في مثل هذا المرض لم يقبل الشفاء بسرعة والنفس غير الناطقة إذا
أدنى عنانها سارت بحسب طبعها ويسير المسامحة ببسطها وقبضها
يتم بالفكر والفكر يقسط أفعالها بأن يفسح لها تارةً بحسب ما ينبغي وتارةً
يقبضها ثم يدرجها حتى يقبضها بالجملة والنفس نصير من معدن إلى هذا
المكان وتشابك المائت وتخطئ من شرفها وتعود من معدن الشرور إلى عالمها
وزاوس الأب المتوعد ولوآب للنفوس والسكاثن في النفوس

الموجودة للناس المتألمة الصادرة من معدن الآلهة وبها يستريح الحيوان

فينا من الآلام الجسدانية يجذب الحيوانية إليها والنفس التي تخلص

61 Ζεύ πάτερ, ἦ πολλῶν καὶ κακῶν λύσεις ἔπειντας,

62 εἰ πάντων δείξεις, οὗτοι τῷ δαίμονι χρώνεται.

[19] من د قلس¹

According to the doctrine of Empedocles, we have in us Love and Strife; through Strife we become dissolved and dissipated, and encounter pain, while through Love we are unified and meet with delight. By the agency of Love we are elevated, and by that of Strife we are made to sink, and our falling into evils of our own choosing occurs when we sink to the lower level, and our intellects enter the world of coming-to-be; we thus damage our faculties of thought, and cause them to abandon the good things that are properly theirs, and anyone who finds himself ailing in such a fashion as this will find no ready cure.

111a

When the irrational soul is given its head, its conduct conforms to its nature, and becomes permissive in its looseness; and its restraint is accomplished by thought. Thought imposes limits upon its activity by alternately giving it reasonable freedom, and then restraining it; it then gradually strengthens its grip upon it until it has it completely under restraint.

The soul departs from its source, takes up residence here, and becomes entangled with mortality, and sinks from its eminent place; then it returns from the abode of evil to its own world.

61,62 Zeus is the one unique Father: He is father of souls.

Demons are souls which have been present in men, and have become divine; they emanate from the divine source, and are the means whereby the animal part of us gains respite from corporeal sufferings, which animality brings upon us. A soul

ذاتها من الانفعالات الجسدانية في التي لها رتبة فاضلة والإله عارفٌ بكل

سكنية وإين محلها كما يعرف الأب ولده والنفوس العقلية كلها تسمى

سكائن التي فوق (و) في الأرض والتي في الأرض في التي في جنس المائتين

111b

والتي فوق الأرض في جنس العلويين

63-65 وفي الناس طبيعة إلهية إذا عسكت بالوصايا الفاضلة عادت إلى

عالمها واستراحت من الآلام الجسدانية والطبيعية والطبيعة الإلهية

التي في الناس في العقل المسمى نفساً ناطقة وتسمى هذه الطبيعة كمرية

وهذه الطبيعة توجد لضابط الكل ولجميع الآلهة والسكنيات التي في قوام

علينا وصفاً أن السكائن شهود على البشر ويكاد أن يكونوا يتم الملائكة

الموكلون بهم والطبيعة الكمرية التي فينا تحيا حياة عقلية سليمة من الشوائب

والآفات وترى الأمور بالعين النقية وتتصرفها بحسب طباعها تتبرأ من هذه

63 ἀλλὰ σὺ θάρσει, ἐπεὶ θεῖον γένος ἐστὶ βροτοῖσιν.

64 οἷς ἱερὰ προφέρουσα φύσις δείκνυσιν ἔκκεσται.

65 ὧν εἴ σοι τι μέτεστι, κρητῆσις ὧν σε κελεύω,

66 ἔκκεσται ψυχὴν βεῖ πόνων ἀπὸ τῶνδε σωώσεις.

which has freed itself from bodily passivities attains a superior rank.

God has knowledge of each demon, and of where it is to be found, just as a father knows his own offspring. The name "demon" is applied to all intellectual souls; those which are on the earth belong to the mortal species, whilst those that are above the earth are of the | heavenly species.

111b

63-65 *There is a divine nature in man:* if it adheres to these excellent admonitions, it will return to its own world, and be delivered from bodily suffering. This divine nature in man is the intellect, called also the rational soul; this nature is also called "priestly."

This nature exists in the controller of the Universe, and in all the gods and demons who are our guardians. The demons are deservedly the witnesses of humankind, since they are close to being the angels who are entrusted with their care.

The priestly nature in us lives an intellectual life that is free from blemish and harm, and sees things in a mysterious way. When it acts according to its nature, it becomes free from these wearisome

الآلام الجسدية المتعبة وتصير به مطهرة مشفاه من الانفعالات التي

تكسبها من عدم النطق وهذه الانفعالات إذا انطاع لها العقل فهي أمراضه

لأنه يشبه بالحيوان غير الناطق وبقرها يصير ملكا ولا يكون عبدا وتبقى

112a انفعالات البدن على البدن ولا يتعرض لها كما قال سقراط عند حلّ

قيده: إني وجدت ألمًا في ساق لا في ذاق ومن الواجب لنا أن نحلى

الحواس والحيوانية التي فينا ونعتقدنا جواهر غريبة من العقل ولا نسلطها

على العقل ويكون العقل في علوم مرتبة وفي استقال مرتبتها ونهرب من

الخيالات غير المنطقية التي في جهالات وعوائق وفواطع حتى يكون الجواهر

الذي فينا مصفى مهذبا ونلقى عنا الألفاء التي لا تليق بهذا الجواهر المصفى

لأننا جعله مظلمًا كدرًا فإذا هرب العقل من هذه الحياة القذرة الحسية

فإنه يصير مطهرا مهذبا ويكون في الأمر الطبيعي لا في الأمر الخارج عن

الطبع وفي الخاص به لا في الغريب

bodily afflictions, and thus becomes purified and healed of the passivities which it acquires through irrationality. When the intellect succumbs to these passivities, they become diseases within it, because it comes to resemble a dumb animal, whereas if it overcomes them, it becomes master rather than slave, and leaves the passivities of the body behind | with the body, and is not subjected to them. As Socrates said when his fetters were removed: "I can feel a pain, but in my leg, not in myself"!

It is our duty to let go of the senses and the animality that is in us, and to look upon them as something intrinsically alien to the intellect, since the intellect is the highest member of its class, whilst the animal faculty is the most inferior member of its class; and we ought to shun irrational fantasies, which are follies, blockages and obstacles, so that our true nature may be clarified and refined. Further, we should discard our passions, since these are not in keeping with this purified essential self, for they would render it murky and turbid. When the intellect shuns this squalid life of the senses, it becomes pure and refined, and can abide by its natural and proper character, rather than conform to a course which is unrelated and alien to it.

112a

67,68,69 فيثاغورس يأمر أن نقرن جوهر العقل الطهارة وأن نخل عنه

الرباطات العاقلة له بالنفس البهيمية وأن تكون الأفعال الإنسانية

112b تحت تدبيرات العقل والنطق ومبدأ طهارة العقل استعمال ما يجل عنه

رباطات الجسم والانطباع لبهيميته وما يكدر حياته الخاصة به

ولا يجل بالإنسان التقيد للبطن والمواصلة لما يدنسه ولا نتمدنا

الأغذية بتقنتها وصلدوتها لكن نعتمد النافع منها والأبسط والألطف

بل يعين نفسه المطهرة في جوهر المهدبة في عنصرنا من هذه الانفعالات

القباح وألا نتطاع لأكل الغرایات المنتنة الروائح والحبوب الغليظة

لنكسها للروح وتقليظها للجسم وتقنن الأطعمة جاذبة لحواسنا إلى

شهوة كل شيء ومخرج لنا من الاعتدال إلى عدم الاعتدال

والإغراق في الشراب مُفسد للعقول ومن الواجب أن يكون ما

67 ἄλλ' εἰργου βρωτῶν, ὧν εἴ ποτε, ἐν τε καθαρῶς,

68 ἐν τε λυσεὶ ψυχῆς κρίνων, καὶ φράξου ἕκαστα,

69 ἡνίοχον γνώμην στήθεος καθύπερθευ ἀρίστην.

67,68,69 Pythagoras commands us to combine purity with the essential intellect, and to free it from the bonds which bind it to the irrational soul; he commands also, that man's actions should be subject to the regulations of the intellect and of reason.

The starting-point towards intellectual purity is the undertaking of practices such as will loosen | the bonds attaching it to the body, and release it 112b from its submission to the bestiality that is in it, and from whatever may defile its proper life. It is unseemly for a man to devote himself to his belly, or to be closely involved in anything that may pollute him. (We must not allow ourselves to be beguiled by variety or sweetness of foodstuffs, but should rely upon foods that are beneficial and those that are simplest and most delicate). Instead he should aid the soul that has been purified in its essence, and whose substance has been cleansed of these vile reactions. Nor should we permit ourselves to consume stinking pieces of meat, or coarse grains, because they darken the spirit and render the body gross, or variety of dishes, which allure our senses and induce them to crave all kinds of things, and render us no longer moderate but immoderate. Excessive drinking is also pernicious to the intellect. It is vital that we only consume as much food as is necessary.

نتناوله من الغذاء هو الضروري وإنما أمر أن يكون التدبير بحسب

النطق لأن العقل عارفٌ بالأسباب وحتى يكون مالك سيرةً في

الشيء الأفضل فينا وفلاطن يقول إن الشهوة هي ضدة توصل

إلى الشرور والعقل لا يصير بنا إلى المستلذ لكن إلى الأنفع والأصنى

113a بنا أن تكون في مدة عمرنا | كله قادرين على غلبة الشهوة بالطهارة حتى

لا نتخذنا انفعالات البدن وتزلزنا نحو الشهوات المبيدة لنا والمُصيرة

لشريف طباعنا بهيمًا لكن ننطاع إلى طباع الخير القيم علينا والمدير لنا وهو

الذي يلحظ منافعنا لا مضارنا

70,71 ويختم فيثاغورس كلامه بالوعد لنا أننا نصير إذا انضغنا

للطبيعة العقلية إلى الأثير الذي هو مسكننا عند تأملنا ونكون إلهيين

غير مائتين وبغير دم ولا تقبل الموت وبالمجلة خاتم هذا التدبير الذي

فينا اكتساب الفضيلة التي بها يترقى العقل ويصير إلى معدن الرأفة

70 ἥν δ' ἀπολείψας σῶμα ἐς αἰθέρ' ἐλεύθερον ἔλθῃς.

71 ἔσσεαι ἀθάνατος, θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκ ἔτι θνητός.

The reason for Pythagoras' commanding that diet be in accordance with reason is that the intellect is familiar with causes, and so that our conduct may be governed by that which is best in us. Plato says that appetite is a snare which leads to disaster; but the intellect does not lead us to what is pleasurable, rather to what is most beneficial, and what is best for us is that throughout our lives we should be | capable of overcoming desire with the help of purity, so that the reactions to which the body is subject will not deceive us, and bring us near to desires which may destroy us and render irrational our noble natures. Instead we should submit to the nature of the good, which is our overseer and our director, and which attends to our interests, not to what is harmful to us.

70,71 Pythagoras concludes his discourse by promising us that if we submit to the intellectual nature, *we shall travel to the ether which will be our home when we become gods, and that we shall be immortals, bloodless gods who will never die.*

In general terms, the conclusion of this inward discipline is for us the acquisition of the virtue whereby the intellect ascends and travels to

113a

وينتقل من الآلام الجسدية فغاية حياتنا أن نكون إلهيين وهذا يتم

لنا إذا ما اقتنت النفس التأله في الحول وتصرفت حسب أصل طباعها

لأنها من مخلوقات الإله ولي بطبيعتها غير مائة وعامة عقلية، وتلحق

بهذه التصرفات بعالمها وترجع إلى أصلها القديم وإذا تأملت بقيت

أبدًا غير مائة وتنقل من عالم السفلى إلى عالم العلو وتنقل من حياة 113b

مركبة إلى حياة بسيطة تحصرها وتعتدى من الأشياء التي كانت تقاسمها

من الطبيعة المائة وتجرد¹ من الأمور المفسدة في الحقيقة التي من أجلها

تغير مائة أرضية لا سماوية غير مائة والمأوى في الأثير يعيد

النفس من عالم الكون الذي تهرب منه إلى عالمها الخاص وكما أن

كل واحد من الأجسام الطبيعية يطلب عالمه الخاص به² فكذا

النفوس تهرب من عالم الكون بأن تطلب عالمها الخاص بها

والأثير هو المكان الشريف جدًا الذي تحت فلك القمر القابل

¹ [وتجرد] ² [يطلب عالمها الخاص بها]

the source of repose, and is removed from bodily sufferings; hence the purpose of life for us is to become divine, and we realize this goal when the soul, in its essential nature, attains divinity, and is active according to its fundamental character — which is, since it is one of God's creatures, to be by nature and immortal, possessing knowledge and having an intellective function. Through these activities it will join its own world, and revert to its eternal source.

When once it becomes divine, it will endure for ever, immortally, and be transported from the | nether world to the upper world, leaving behind it a 113b life of complexity to assume the life of simplicity which is proper to it; it will transcend the things which it has had to endure, which arise from mortal nature, and rid itself of the truly corruptive things which render it mortal and earthbound instead of heavenly and immortal.

When the soul takes refuge in the ether, its so doing returns it from the world of becoming, from which it is fleeing, to its proper goal. Just as every natural body seeks its own proper world, so do souls flee from the world of becoming in their search for their proper world.

The ether is the most exalted place that exists beneath the lunar sphere, receiving souls

للنفوس التي تهرب من الكون وتحيا حياة إلهية فالشبيه أبدا يطلب
 شبيهه فالذى يحيا حياة إلهية يطلب أبدا المكان المرتب المنتظم والذي
 يحيا حياة غير إلهية وانفعالية يطلب المكان غير المنتظم المظلم الذي تحت
 الأرض الموضوع في مقابلة الأثير المشرق المضئ الذي هو الهواء
 الصافي لا الكدر | الخالط أسفل وثم مسكن النفوس التي تطهرت 114a
 ولوعالها وآل فيثاغورس يقولون أن النفوس التي حسنت
 سيرتها في حياتها ترتقى إلى ما هناك وتتحرك دورا في جميع المكان
 الذي تحت القمر

وفائنا تنقطع مرة مقالة فيثاغورس

الذهبية بتفسير برقلس ولله الحمد

والشكر كاستحقاقه

that are fleeing from becoming and leading divine lives; for like always seeks like; thus that which is living a divine life always seeks out a stable and orderly environment, whilst that which is leading a life which is not divine but passive will seek an environment that is murky and disordered, and this place is to be found under the earth, opposite to the ether which is radiant and lucid and consists of air which is clear, not turbid | or intermixed with air from a lower region. It is this which is the abode of souls which have become pure, and this is their world. 114a

The Pythagoreans say that souls whose conduct in life has been good are elevated to this place, and revolve in a circular motion which covers the whole of space in the sublunar region.

Here breaks off the piece on the salient points of Pythagoras' golden discourse, according to Proclus' commentary, and to God be due praise and gratitude.